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Abstract 
 The social value of risk reduction (SVRR) is the marginal social value of reducing an 
individual’s fatality risk, as measured by some social welfare function (SWF).  This Article 
investigates SVRR, using a lifetime utility model in which individuals are differentiated by age, 
lifetime income profile, and lifetime risk profile. We consider both the utilitarian SWF and a 
“prioritarian” SWF, which applies a strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation to 
individual utility. 
 We show that the prioritarian SVRR provides a rigorous basis in economic theory for the 
“fair innings” concept, proposed in the public health literature: as between an older individual 
and a similarly situated younger individual (one with the same income and risk profile), a risk 
reduction for the younger individual is accorded greater social weight even if the gains to 
expected lifetime utility are equal.  The comparative statics of prioritarian and utilitarian SVRRs 
with respect to age, and to (past, present, and future) income and baseline survival probability, 
are significantly different from the conventional value per statistical life (VSL).  Our empirical 
simulation based upon the U.S. population survival curve and income distribution shows that 
prioritarian SVRRs with a moderate degree of concavity in the transformation function conform 
to widely held views regarding lifesaving policies: the young should take priority but income 
should make no difference. 
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 Is it socially more important to save the lives of younger individuals, than to save the 
lives of the old?  It seems hard to dispute that younger individuals should take priority with 
respect to lifesaving measures to the extent that age inversely correlates with life expectancy 
remaining, at least if the younger and older individuals are similarly situated with respect to the 
other determinants of well-being (health, income, etc.).5  If Anne is similarly situated to Bob, 
except for being younger, and a given reduction in Anne’s current mortality risk produces a 
larger increase in her life expectancy than the same reduction in Bob’s, the risk reduction for 
Anne seems socially more valuable. 
 But some have argued that the young should take priority with respect to lifesaving 
measures, and health policy more generally, on fairness grounds—not merely on the utilitarian 
basis that lifesaving measures directed at the young tend to yield a greater increase in life 
expectancy and expected lifetime well-being.  Harris (1985, p. 91) introduced the idea of “fair 
innings” into the public health literature:  “The fair innings argument requires that everyone be 
given an equal chance to have a fair innings, to reach the appropriate threshold but, having 
reached it, they have received their entitlement.  The rest of their life is the sort of bonus which 
may be canceled when this is necessary to help others reach the threshold.”  Others who have 
endorsed some version of the fair innings concept include Williams (1997); Daniels (1988); 
Lockwood (1988); Nord (2005); Bognar (2008, 2015); Ottersen (2013).  The notion that the 
young should receive priority with respect to lifesaving measures is reflected, not merely in the 
academic literature on fair innings, but also in surveys of citizen preferences regarding health 
policy.  (Bognar 2008; Dolan et al. 2005; Dolan and Tsuchiya 2012).    
 Bognar (2015, p. 254) uses the following thought experiment to crystallize the fair 
innings concept. 
[Y]ou have only one drug and there are two patients who need it.  The only difference between the two 
patients is their age.  . . . You have to choose between saving: (C) a 20-year old patient who will live for 10 
more years if she gets the drug; or (D) a 70-year old patient who will live for 10 more years if she gets the 
drug.   
Both patients would spend the remaining ten years of their life in good health. So there is no difference in 
expected benefit.  The only difference is how much they have already lived when they receive the benefit. 
… [According to] the fairness-based argument for the fair innings view, you should … prefer C to D.   
 
5 More precisely, this proposition is hard to dispute for those who endorse welfarism: who believe that governmental 
policies should be evaluated in light of the sum total and distribution of individual well-being.  By contrast, non-
welfarists might argue that everyone has an equal right to life, and that governments should not differentially value 
lifesaving on the basis of any individual characteristics (including age).   
This Article presupposes welfarism.  Welfarism is the dominant ethical view in economics, and both of the 
assessment frameworks we consider in this article—the social-welfare-function framework and benefit-cost-
analysis—are versions of welfarism. (On welfarism, see generally Adler [2012, 2019].) 
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We’ll build on the suggestion of Bognar (2015) in using the term “fair innings” to mean the 
following: as between a policy that produces a given gain in expected lifetime well-being for a 
younger person, and an otherwise-identical policy that produces the same gain in expected 
lifetime well-being for an older person, it is ethically better for society to undertake the first 
policy.   
 While fair innings in this sense is an intuitively appealing idea, it is not supported by the 
current economic literature regarding the valuation of lifesaving.  That literature generally 
focuses on benefit-cost analysis (BCA), which is the dominant tool in governmental practice for 
assessing fatality risk-reduction policies. The methodology of BCA does not support the idea that 
gains to the young are socially more valuable than equal gains for the old.6 
 In this Article, we examine the fair innings concept as part of a broader analysis of the 
use of social welfare functions (SWFs) to value risk reduction, and a comparison of the SWF 
framework to BCA.  We show, in particular, that “prioritarian” SWFs place greater weight on 
gains to expected lifetime well-being accruing to younger rather than older individuals.  We thus 
demonstrate that the fair innings concept has a rigorous basis in welfare economics—specifically 
in the SWF framework, not BCA.  
 BCA appraises government policies by summing individuals’ monetary equivalents—an 
individual’s monetary equivalent for a policy being the amount of money she is willing to pay or 
accept for it, relative to the status quo.  In turn, the value per statistical life (VSL) is the concept 
that captures how BCA values fatality risk reduction. VSL is the marginal rate of substitution 
between an individual’s material resources (wealth, income, or consumption) and survival 
probability in a period.  Put differently, VSL is the coefficient that translates a change in 
someone’s survival probability into a monetary equivalent.  Individual i’s willingness to pay for 
a small improvement Δpi in survival probability is approximately VSLi   Δpi. 
 BCA, although now widespread, is controversial.  A different framework for evaluating 
policy—one that has strong roots in economic theory and plays a major role in various bodies of 
scholarship within economics—is the social welfare function (SWF).  The SWF framework 
measures policy impacts in terms of interpersonally comparable well-being, not monetary 
equivalents.  Each possible outcome is a vector of individual well-being numbers, and a given 
policy is a probability distribution over such vectors.  The SWF, abbreviated W(ꞏ), assigns a 
social value to a policy P, W(P), in light of the probability distribution over outcomes and, thus, 
well-being vectors that P corresponds to.  On the SWF framework, see generally Adler (2012, 
2019); Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005, chs. 2-4); Bossert and Weymark (2004); 
Weymark (2016). 
 In previous work (Adler, Hammitt and Treich [2014]), we analyzed the application of the 
SWF framework to risk policies and compared how it values risk reduction to VSL.  The key 
 
6 See below, Section 3, explaining why BCA does not support fair innings. 
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construct in our analysis was the social value of risk reduction (SVRR).  The SVRR for 
individual i is the social value per unit of risk reduction to individual i, calculated for a marginal 






, and the change 
in the SWF that occurs with a change Δpi in individual i’s survival probability pi is 
approximately SVRRi Δpi..   
 Using the simple, one-period model that is often employed in the literature on VSL, 
Adler, Hammitt and Treich (2014) calculated SVRRi for different types of SWFs: the utilitarian, 
“ex ante prioritarian,” and “ex post prioritarian” SWFs.  (Utilitarianism ranks outcomes by 
summing well-being numbers, while prioritarianism does so by summing a strictly increasing 
and strictly concave transformation of well-being, thereby giving priority to those at lower well-
being levels.  The idea of utilitarianism dates back hundreds of years to the writings of Jeremy 
Bentham; prioritarianism is a more recent concept, pioneered by the moral philosopher Derek 
Parfit [2000]. The ex ante and ex post prioritarian SWFs are two distinct specifications of 
prioritarianism for the case of uncertainty.)  We analyzed the comparative statics of SVRRi and 
VSLi with respect to individual wealth and baseline risk.   
 The current Article significantly expands the analysis of Adler, Hammitt and Treich 
(2014).  We use a much richer model of individual resources and survival. An individual’s life 
has multiple periods, up to a maximum T (e.g., 100 years).  Each individual is characterized by a 
lifetime risk profile (a probability of surviving to the end of each period, conditional on her being 
alive at its beginning); a lifetime income profile (an income amount which she earns in each 
period if she survives to its end); and a current age.  This multi-period setup permits a more 
nuanced analysis of SVRRi and VSLi.  In particular, we can now examine the comparative statics 
of SVRRi and VSLi with respect to an individual’s age as well as with respect to (past, present 
and future) income and baseline fatality risk. 
 The SWF framework is widely used in some areas of economics, such as optimal tax 
theory and climate economics.   (Overviews of the use of the SWF framework in these two 
literatures are provided by Tuomala [2016] and Botzen and van den Bergh [2014] respectively.) 
It is also employed in health economics, with the SWF here typically being applied to a 
population characterized in terms of longevity and health states. (Bleichrodt, Diecidue and 
Quiggin 2004; Dolan 1998; Hougaard, Moreno-Ternero, and Østerdal 2013; Østerdal 2005; 
Williams 1997.)  However, little research has been undertaken applying the SWF framework to 
the policy domain of fatality risk reduction—a major arena of governmental policymaking 
(Graham 2008).  We aim to make headway in exploring this important and understudied topic, 
and to raise its profile in the research community.  
 Section 2 sets forth the model and the SWFs we will consider.  Section 3 analyzes the 
comparative statics of SVRRi and VSLi with respect to age.  We provide a formal statement of 
the fair innings concept, via properties which we term “Priority for the Young” and “Ratio 
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Priority for the Young.”  We show that the ex ante prioritarian SVRRi and ex post prioritarian 
SVRRi both display Priority for the Young and indeed the logically stronger property of “Ratio 
Priority for the Young.”  By contrast, VSLi does not have either property. 7   
 Section 4 analyzes the comparative statics of SVRRi and VSLi with respect to income 
and baseline risk.  Section 5 undertakes an empirical exercise, based on the U.S. population 
survival curve and income distribution, to illustrate the SVRRi concept and to estimate the 
impact of age and income on SVRRi and VSLi. 
 Our headline results are as follows.  First, we demonstrate that the SWF framework—by 
contrast with BCA—provides a rigorous basis for the “fair innings” concept.  The social value of 
risk reduction (SVRR), as calculated using an ex ante or ex post prioritarian SWF, gives extra 
social weight to risk reduction for younger individuals above and beyond the additional weight 
they receive in virtue of greater life expectancy remaining.  (In an important article, Williams 
[1997] proposes to operationalize the “fair innings” concept via a non-utilitarian SWF applied to 
individuals’ quality-adjusted life expectancies; but Williams does not develop this proposal 
formally, as we do here.) 
 Second, we show that the manner in which BCA values risk reduction is significantly 
different from the SWF framework, regardless of which SWF is used (utilitarian, ex ante 
prioritarian, ex post prioritarian).  These differences are multifold.  The prioritarian SVRRs 
display Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young, while VSL does not.  Further, as 
established in Section 4, the comparative statics of VSL with respect to income and baseline risk 
are different not only from the ex ante and ex post prioritarian SVRRs, but also from the 
utilitarian SVRR.  Finally, Section 5 demonstrates that these analytic differences may be 
empirically quite significant.  In particular, VSL increases much more steeply with income in 
each age group than the utilitarian SVRR, while the prioritarian SVRRs are flat or decrease with 
income.8 
 The text of the Article sets forth our analytic apparatus, defines relevant concepts, states 
our analytic results (as numbered propositions), and interprets these findings or explains the 
intuition behind them.   However, so as to limit the length of the Article and increase readability, 
we do not include proofs of these propositions in the text.  Instead, proofs are provided in an on-
line Appendix.   
 This Article was drafted prior to the coronavirus pandemic of 2020.  How to choose 
fatality-risk-reduction policies was an important topic before the pandemic, and will remain so 
 
7 The utilitarian SVRR also does not display Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young, but this is true 
by definition—since these properties are defined relative to a utilitarian baseline. See Section 3.  
8 The properties of the ex ante prioritarian and ex post prioritarian SVRRs depend, to some extent, on which concave 
transformation function is used—embodying the degree of priority for the worse off.  Thus, in Section 5, the 
prioritarian SVRRs with a moderately concave transformation function are flat with income, while the prioritarian 
SVRRs with a more concave transformation decrease with income.  
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after the pandemic abates.  But the terrible events of 2020 underscore the significance of the 
questions we address here.  One issue that quickly became salient as Covid-19 cases exploded 
was risk allocation. Which Covid-19 patients should take priority in receiving scarce medical 
equipment that would reduce the risk of dying from the disease, such as ventilators?  Which 
uninfected individuals should go to the front of the line in receiving scarce protective equipment, 
such as N95 masks?  The SWF framework provides a systematic methodology for answering 
such questions.  It gives guidance in determining how the social value of reducing an 
individual’s fatality risk (in these cases, her risk of dying from Covid-19) should vary, or not, 
depending upon her age, income, and other characteristics.  Understanding these relative social 
valuations, for three major SWFs—utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian—is 
precisely the topic of this Article.  
2. Conceptual Framework 
 2.1 Model of the Population  
 There is a population of N individuals.  The life of a given individual i is divided into 
periods 1, 2, …, t, …, T, with T the maximum number of periods that any individual can live.  
Each individual is characterized by an age, risk profile, and income profile, to be explained 
momentarily.  
 Calendar time is divided into the present time (also referred as the “current” time), earlier 
times (“the past”), and later times (“the future”).  This enables us to endow each individual i with 
an “age,” denoted as Ai.  We assume that individuals’ periods are synchronized, such that the 
present time is the beginning of some period for each of the N individuals.   Ai is the number of 
the present period for individual i.  For example, if Betty has already lived 4 periods, and the 
present time is the beginning of period 5 of Betty’s life, then ABetty = 5, i.e., Betty’s “age” is 5.9   
Ai ≤ T and we also assume that Ai ≥ 2.10 
 Death and survival are conceptualized as follows. Consider a given individual i and some 
period t in her life.  Assuming the individual is alive at the beginning of period t, she may either 
die before the period ends, or survive to the end of the period (equivalently, be alive at the 
beginning of the following period).  Let pi(t) denote individual i’s probability of surviving to the 
end of period t, conditional on being alive at the beginning of period t.  We’ll generally refer to 
pi(t) as a “survival probability.”  Individual i is characterized by a vector of such probabilities, 
one for each period up to T—for short, her “risk profile.”  
 
9 Note that our definition of individual i’s “age” as Ai is slightly different from the colloquial use of the term “age.”  
If Betty is at the beginning of the period 5 of her life, then (colloquially) we would say that her age is 4, not 5.   
However, we need a natural-language term to refer to Ai, and “age” is the most natural choice.   The issue here is 
purely semantic.  Referring to Ai as individual i’s “age” rather than “age plus one” makes no difference to our 
analytic results. 
10 See below, note 22, for an explanation why we assume that Ai ≥ 2. 
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In our model, these probabilities do not change as the individual ages.  Individual i is 
endowed at birth with survival probabilities for each period t = 1, …, T; and pi(t) at the present 
time, the beginning of period Ai, is this at-birth probability.11   
 Let πi(t; t*) denote individual i’s probability of surviving to the end of period t of her life, 
conditional on being alive at the beginning of period t*.   In particular, πi(t; Ai) is individual i’s 
probability of surviving to the end of period t of her life, conditional on being alive at the 
beginning of period Ai—that is, her probability of surviving to the end of period t, conditional on 





t A p s

 . 
 Finally, let μi(t; t*) denote individual i’s probability of living exactly t periods, 
conditional on being alive at the beginning of period t*.  That is, μi(t; t*) is the probability, 
conditional on being alive at the beginning of period t*, of surviving through the end of period t 
and then dying before the end of the next period.   In particular, μi(t; Ai) is the individual’s 
probability of living exactly t periods, conditional on being alive at the beginning of period Ai—
conditional on her current age.    
If t < (Ai – 1), μi(t; Ai) = 0.  If t = (Ai −1), μi(t; Ai) is the individual’s probability, 
conditional on her current age, of not surviving the current period and instead living exactly (Ai – 
1) periods.  That is μi(Ai − 1; Ai) = 1 – pi(Ai).   Finally, if t ≥ Ai, we have that: 
( ; ) ( ; )(1 ( 1))i i i i it A t A p t    . 
 The earnings process is as follows: if an individual survives to the end of period t, she 
earns an income amount yi(t) > 0.  Individual i, thus, is characterized by a vector of incomes, 
(yi(1), …, yi(T))—her “income profile.”  An individual’s income profile, like her risk profile, is 
(in our model) given to the individual at birth and does not change as she ages.12 
 Period consumption, like period income, is modelled as occurring only if the individual 
survives to the end of the period.  An individual’s consumption during period t, if she survives to 
the end of period t, is denoted ci(t).  We assume “myopic” consumption: ci(t) = yi(t). The 
 
11 A different way to model an individual’s fatality risks over the life course would be to conceptualize pi(t) as the 
currently known conditional probability of i’s surviving period t, given that she is alive at the beginning of that 
period.  On this approach, pi(t) = 1 for t < Ai, since i knows she has survived to the beginning of period Ai.  
Modelling fatality risks this way would not change our results, since the formulas for the utilitarian, ex ante 
prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian SVRRs, and for VSL, do not depend upon past survival probabilities; and 
because currently known survival probabilities for the present and future periods are the same as at-birth survival 
probabilities (see Appendix). 
 We assume 0 < pi(t) < 1 for all t such that 1 < t ≤ T; and that pi(1) = 1. As discussed below, note 22, we 
assume that Ai ≥ 2 for all i—that is, that every individual has survived to the end of the first period of her life—and 
to ensure this we assume pi(1) = 1.  Finally, pi(T + 1) = 0. (This is the probability that i survives one more period, 
given that she has survived to the end of period T, the maximum number of possible periods.) 
12 Of course, if t and t* are distinct periods, then it may well be the case that yi(t) ≠ yi(t*). But the profile of incomes 
(yi(1), …, yi(T))—specifying, for each period, what the individual will earn at the end of that period if she survives 
to that point—does not itself change as the individual ages. 
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individual consumes in each period whatever she earns then, rather than saving earnings for 
future consumption or financing consumption by borrowing against future earnings.    
“Myopic” consumption might occur because of imperfect markets—the individual lacks 
access to the financial instruments enabling her to save and borrow—or because of myopic 
thinking on the individual’s part.   Given length constraints, we do not here analyze SVRRi with 
a multiperiod model and individual saving and borrowing.  This is an important topic for future 
research.13  
 Individuals have a common lifetime utility function U(∙), defined as the discounted sum 
of period utility.  Let u(∙) be the common period utility function and β = 1/(1 + φ), φ  ≥ 0 the 
constant utility discount rate.  Ui(s) denotes the individual’s lifetime utility if she lives exactly s 
periods. 
1





U s u y t

 .14  We assume that u(ꞏ) is twice differentiable and that u′(ꞏ) > 0, 
u′′(ꞏ) < 0. 
 Note that the above formula for lifetime utility includes a term for a given period t iff15 
the individual survives to the end of the period.  If she doesn’t survive to the end of a given 
period, her period utility is zero.  Further, our analysis presupposes that, if i does survive to the 
end of period t, with consumption ci(t) in that period, u(ci(t)) > 0. Note that if u(ci(t)) < 0, 
increasing pi(t) may have the effect of lowering i’s expected lifetime utility.  We wish to focus 
here on the case in which risk reduction is beneficial to individuals—not the unusual case in 
which it may be harmful.16 
 We use Vi to denote the expected lifetime utility of individual i, given his age, risk 
profile, and income profile.  
1
( ; ) ( )
i
T
i i i i
t A
V t A U t
 
  .   This formula for Vi  is straightforward.   
Given that i is alive at the beginning of period Ai, the possible lifespans for him are (Ai −1), Ai, 
…, T.  The immediately preceding formula aggregates over these possible lifespans, calculating 
the lifetime utility for each possible lifespan and multiplying each possible lifetime utility Ui (t) 









i i i i i
t t A
V u y t t A u y t  

 
   .   This formula takes each period of i’s 
life, 1, …, T; calculates the discounted period utility for that period; multiplies by the probability 
 
13 In the working paper upon which the current Article is based, we do address the topic of SVRRi with saving and 
borrowing, although do not undertake a comprehensive analysis.  See Adler, Ferranna, Hammitt and Treich (2019). 
14 Since consumption occurs at the end of each period, the discount factor β is raised to the power t rather than (t−1). 
15 “iff” means “if and only if.” 
16 In order to ensure that u(ci(t)) > 0 for all i and t, we assume that there is a “subsistence” level of consumption czero 
such that u(czero) = 0 and that yi(t) > czero for all i, t. 
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of i surviving to the end of that period, conditional on his current age;17 and sums up over all the 
periods.  
 2.2 Social Welfare Functions (SWFs) 
 We’ll use the term “policy” to mean some course of action or inaction by the 
government.  The status quo, therefore, is a “policy”:  government chooses not to change 
individuals’ risk profiles or income profiles.  A policy intervention, relative to the status quo, is 
also a “policy”: government changes individuals’ risk profiles and/or income profiles, 
specifically by changing present survival probabilities, future survival probabilities, present 
income amounts, and/or future income amounts.  An individual’s risk profile or income profile 
with a given policy P is denoted with the superscript “P.”  Thus ( )Pip t  is i’s survival probability 
in period t with policy P and ( )Piy t  is her period t income with policy P. 
 The SWF framework has three components: an interpersonally comparable well-being 
measure, which converts each possible outcome (a possible social consequence) into a vector of 
well-being numbers, one for each of the persons in the population; a rule for ranking well-being 
vectors; and an uncertainty module, namely a procedure for applying the rule to policies 
understood as probability distributions across outcomes.  (Adler 2012, 2019.)  If individuals have 
a common utility function, then the well-being measure can be equated with that utility function 
(which is the approach we follow here).  (Adler 2019, ch. 3, app. D.)  In what follows, we use 
“SWF” to mean the combination of a rule for ranking well-being vectors and an uncertainty 
module for that rule. 
 We consider three SWFs: the utilitarian SWF, the ex ante prioritarian SWF, and the ex 
post prioritarian SWF.   Each assigns a score (a real number) to a given policy P, and ranks 
policies in the order of these scores.  We’ll denote the utilitarian SWF as WU(∙), the ex ante 
prioritarian SWF as WEAP(∙), and the ex post prioritarian SWF as WEPP(∙)—or, more compactly, 
as WU, WEAP, and WEPP.   We’ll use W(∙) as a generic term to indicate any SWF, with W(∙) then 
specified as WU, WEAP, WEPP, or as some other SWF.18  
 The utilitarian rule ranks well-being vectors according to the sum of well-being.  The 
standard procedure for applying the utilitarian rule under uncertainty is to sum individuals’ 
expected well-being. This yields the utilitarian SWF. 







   
 
17 As noted above, if t < Ai, then πi(t; Ai) = 1. 
18 SVRRi for a given W(∙) is the partial derivative of W(∙) with respect to i’s current survival probability. See Section 
2.3.  In order for this partial derivative to be well-defined, the SWF needs to be score-based, as are WU, WEAP, and 
WEPP (assigning a real number to each policy and ranking policies in the order of those numbers), and indeed 
differentiable, as are WU, WEAP, and WEPP given the model here. 
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The prioritarian rule ranks well-being vectors according to the sum of a strictly increasing 
and strictly concave transformation of individual well-being.  Let g(∙) denote some strictly 
increasing and strictly concave function.   By summing g(∙)-transformed well-being numbers, the 
prioritarian rule has the effect of giving greater weight to well-being changes affecting worse-off 
individuals.   Assume that in well-being vector w a better-off individual is at well-being level wH, 
and a worse-off individual is at well-being level wL, with wH > wL.  Let ∆w > 0 be a change in 
well-being.  Well-being vector w* is identical to w, except that the better-off person is at well-
being level wH + ∆w.  Well-being vector w** is identical to w, except that the worse-off person 
is at well-being level wL + ∆w.  The utilitarian rule is indifferent between w* and w**, while the 
prioritarian rule prefers w**, by virtue of the strict concavity of g(∙).  It prefers to give a fixed 
increment in well-being to a worse-off person rather than to a better-off one. 
The two main approaches to applying the prioritarian rule under uncertainty are ex ante 
prioritarianism and ex post prioritarianism.19  (Adler 2012, ch. 7; Adler 2019, app. J; Adler 
Hammitt and Treich 2014.)  Ex ante prioritarianism assigns a score to a given policy by 
calculating expected well-being for each individual; applying the transformation function, g(∙), to 
each individual’s expected well-being; and then summing up these g(∙)- transformed well-being 
expectations.  Ex post prioritarianism assigns a score to a given policy by taking the expected 
value, for each individual, of her g(∙)-transformed well-being; and summing up these expected 
transformed well-being numbers.20  In a nutshell, the ex ante prioritarian formula is the sum 
across individuals of transformed expected well-being, while the ex post prioritarian formula is 
the sum across individuals of expected transformed well-being.  
Ex ante and ex post prioritarianism each have a central place in the literature on 
prioritarianism because each has axiomatic advantages compared to the other.  It can be shown 
that no procedure for applying the prioritarian rule under uncertainty can satisfy both the ex ante 
Pareto axioms, and a very plausible axiom of stochastic dominance.   Ex ante prioritarianism 
satisfies the ex ante Pareto axioms, but violates stochastic dominance; ex post prioritarianism 
satisfies stochastic dominance, but violates the ex ante Pareto axioms.21  (Utilitarianism satisfies 
 
19 The choice between ex ante and ex post approaches to equity has also been discussed in health economics.  
(Bleichrodt 1997). 
20 The rule for ex post prioritarianism is often stated in a different way: as the expected value of the sum of 
individuals’ transformed well-being.  But this is mathematically equivalent to the rule stated in the text: the expected 
value of the sum of individuals’ transformed well-being equals the sum of individuals’ expected transformed well-
being. (Adler 2019, app. J). 
21 The ex ante Pareto axioms are Ex Ante Pareto Indifference and Ex Ante Strong Pareto.   Ex Ante Pareto 
Indifference:  If each person’s expected well-being with policy P is equal to her expected well-being with policy P*, 
then P and P* are equally good.  Ex Ante Strong Pareto: If each person’s expected well-being with policy P is 
greater than or equal to her expected well-being with policy P*, and at least one person’s expected well-being is 
strictly greater, then P is better than P*.   Stochastic Dominance:  If, for each possible state of nature, the well-being 
vector produced by policy P in that state is better than the well-being vector produced by policy P*, then P is better 
than P*.   On the axiomatic properties of utilitarianism and prioritarianism under uncertainty, see generally Adler 
2012 ch. 7; Adler 2019 ch. 3-4, apps. I-L. 
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the ex ante Pareto axioms and stochastic dominance, but lacks the extra weighting for the worse 
off that is characteristic of prioritarianism, and that its proponents find to be ethically attractive.) 
In the model here, the formulas for ex ante and ex post prioritarianism are as follows. 
Definition 1b:  The Ex Ante Prioritarian SWF.  
1
( ) ( )
NEAP P
ii
W P g V

  , with g(∙) a 
strictly increasing and strictly concave function.   
Definition 1c:  The Ex Post Prioritarian SWF.  
1 1






W P t A g U t
  
   , 
with g(∙) a strictly increasing and strictly concave function.   
 The utilitarian SWF is a specific SWF (a specific formula for ranking policies as a 
function of individuals’ ages, risk profiles, and income profiles) while the ex ante prioritarian 
SWF and ex post prioritarian SWF are, each, families of SWFs.  The choice of a particular 
strictly increasing and strictly concave g(∙) defines a specific WEAP and WEPP.   Our analysis will 
be generic, holding true for any g(ꞏ).  We do assume that g(ꞏ) is twice differentiable, so that g′(ꞏ) 
> 0 and g′′(ꞏ) < 0.22 
 Note that all three SWFs are defined in terms of individuals’ lifetime well-being.  WU 
calculates each individual’s expected lifetime well-being, and sums across individuals.  WEAP 
calculate each individual’s transformed expected lifetime well-being, and sums across 
individuals.  WEPP calculates each individual’s expected transformed lifetime well-being, and 
sums across individuals.  The application of SWFs to lifetime well-being has a strong ethical 
justification.  (Adler 2012, ch. 6). While much of the SWF literature uses one-period models for 
reasons of tractability, there is also a significant body of work using multiperiod or lifetime 
numbers as the input to an SWF.23  (For discussion of this literature, see Adler [2012, p. 245]; 
Boadway [2012, pp. 86-106]; Tuomala [2016, pp. 360-64].) 
 2.3 The Social Value of Risk Reduction (SVRR) 
 
22 The “Atkinson” family of g(∙) functions—g(u) = (1−γ)−1u1−γ, γ > 0, γ ≠ 1; and g(u) = ln u if γ = 1—have attractive 
axiomatic properties and are regularly used in the economic literature on prioritarianism.  See Adler (2012, ch. 5).  
(Indeed our empirical exercise in Section 5 uses an Atkinson g(∙) function.)  The Atkinson g(∙) is such that g(0) is 
undefined for γ ≥ 1.  In order for our analysis to accommodate the possibility that g(0) is undefined, we assume that 
Ai ≥ 2 for all i.  (Note that the expression for the ex post prioritarian SWF in Definition 1c includes the g(∙) value of 
individual i’s lifetime well-being if she lives exactly (Ai −1) periods.  If Ai = 1, the individual’s lifetime well-being if 
she lives exactly Ai – 1 periods is 0.)   Because the period length can be arbitrarily short, the assumption that Ai ≥ 2 
is not significantly restrictive.  
23 Similarly, while much empirical work on income inequality focuses on annual income, there is also a significant 
body of work that looks at the inequality of lifetime income.   See, for example, Bönke et al. (2015), Bowlus and 
Robin (2004), Guvenen et al. (2017), Huggett et al. (2011), Nilsen et al. (2012). 
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 We’ll use the “O” superscript to denote an individual’s status quo income and risk 
profiles: piO(t) is individual i’s status quo survival probability for period t and yiO(t) her status 
quo income for period t.  
 Assume that government enacts a policy intervention, relative to the status quo, at the 
beginning of the current period.  Among other effects, the policy may change individual i’s 
current survival probability.  Let Δpi be this change:  i’s current survival probability in the status 
quo is piO(Ai) and her current survival probability after the intervention is piO(Ai) + Δpi.  
 We can now define SVRRi, which will be useful in understanding the impact of this 
policy intervention on social welfare.  
Definition 2: The Social Value of Risk Reduction (SVRRi).  SVRRi for a given SWF 






evaluated at i’s status quo risk and income profile.24  
By the total differential approximation from calculus, the change in social welfare resulting from 
Δpi is approximately SVRRi Δpi.25   
 Intuitively, SVRRi is the change in social welfare per unit of current risk reduction for 
individual i, as calculated for a marginal such reduction.  To be sure, a governmental policy 
intervention may well have effects other than changing individuals’ current survival 
probabilities.  It may also change their survival probabilities in future periods.  And a risk-
reduction intervention will surely have costs, which will be reflected in a change to individuals’ 
current and/or future incomes.  The total effect of a policy intervention on social welfare will be 
approximately equal to the sum, across individuals, of SVRRi Δpi plus corresponding terms for 
changes to future survival probabilities and to incomes.  SVRRi captures that portion of a policy 
intervention’s total impact on social welfare that results from the change to individual i’s current 
survival probability.   
 
24 Formally, ( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( ))
( )
O O O O
i i i i i
i i
W













 can be expressed just as a function of i’s risk and income profiles; the value of this 
partial derivative does not depend upon other individuals’ risks and incomes.  
25 Assume that a policy intervention changes individual i’s current survival probability by ∆pi; her survival 
probability in period t by ∆pit, with t > Ai; and her income in period t by ∆yit, with t ≥ Ai.  Then, by the total-
differential approximation from calculus, ∆W is approximately equal to:  
1
( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( )) ( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( ))
( ) ( )
i i
T T
O O O O t O O O O t
i i i i i i i i i i i i
i t A t Ai i
W W
SVRR p p p T y y T p p p T y y T y
p t y t  
 









 Further, by comparing SVRRi to SVRRj, for two individuals i and j—as we do below—
we can determine the relative social impact of risk reductions for the two.  Consider a change ∆p 
to someone’s current survival probability.  That risk change, if accruing to individual i, results in 
a change of social welfare by approximately SVRRi Δp.   If accruing to individual j, it results in 
a change of social welfare by approximately SVRRj Δp.  Thus (for a small ∆p) the first social 
welfare change is larger than/smaller than/equal to the second iff SVRRi is larger than/smaller 
than/equal to SVRRj.   
 SVRRi is defined (Definition 2) as the partial derivative of the SWF with respect to 
individual i’s current survival probability, with this partial derivative evaluated at individual i’s 
status quo risk and income profiles.  This reference to the status quo doesn’t limit the generality 
of the definition.  For any assignment of income and risk profiles to individuals, we can take that 
assignment as the status quo and consider the social welfare impact of policy interventions 
relative to that baseline.  
 As a notational matter, we’ll also denote SVRRi for a generic SWF W(∙) as Si; and SVRRi 





 Using the definition of SVRRi and of the SWFs (Definitions 1a, 1b, 1c), it is 
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      
 Proposition 1b.   ( )EAP O Ui i iS g V S   
 Proposition 1c.  
( ; )




EPP O Oi i
i i i iO
t A i i
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      
 We can provide intuitive explanations for these formulas, beginning with the utilitarian 
SVRRi.  Observe that UiS is equal to the difference between (1) individual i’s expected lifetime 














 , and (2) her 
realized lifetime well-being if she dies during the current period (does not survive it), i.e., 
( 1)Oi iU A  .   
Consider the simple case in which individual i would die for certain during the current 
period, absent governmental intervention, and intervention ensures that she survives the period. 
In this case, clearly, the change in utilitarian social welfare that results from the intervention is 
 
26 We remind the reader that proofs of numbered propositions can be found in the on-line Appendix. 
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the difference between individual i’s expected lifetime well-being conditional on surviving the 
current period, and her realized lifetime well-being if she dies during the current period.  For 
short, let’s term this difference the “utilitarian gain from saving individual i.”  
 More generally, consider a policy which increases individual i’s current survival 
probability by ∆pi. The change in utilitarian social welfare that results from the ∆pi increase is 
just ∆pi multiplied by the utilitarian gain from saving individual i.  Thus UiS , the marginal change 
in utilitarian social welfare per unit of current-period risk reduction for individual i, is nothing 
other than 
( ; )






t A i i
t A




   : the utilitarian gain from saving individual i. 
 The formula for the ex ante prioritarian SVRRi, EAPiS , is the utilitarian SVRRi multiplied 
by a weighting factor, ( )Oig V .  This weighting factor is a function of the individual’s expected 
lifetime well-being, and decreases as expected lifetime well-being increases.  It reflects the 
priority given by the ex ante prioritarian SWF to individuals at lower levels of expected lifetime 
well-being.   
Finally, the formula for the ex post prioritarian SVRRi, EPPiS , is the same as that for the 
utilitarian SVRRi, except that transformed lifetime well-being, g(Ui), is substituted for lifetime 
well-being Ui.  Consider the case in which individual i would die for certain during the current 
period, absent governmental intervention, and intervention ensures that she survives the period. 
In this case, the change in ex post prioritarian social welfare that results from the intervention is 
the difference between individual i’s expected transformed lifetime well-being conditional on 














 , and her realized transformed lifetime well-
being if she dies during the current period, ( ( 1))Oi ig U A  .  For short, let’s term this difference 
the “ex post prioritarian gain from saving individual i.”  
 More generally, consider a policy which increases individual i’s current survival 
probability by ∆pi. The change in ex post prioritarian social welfare that results from the ∆pi 
increase is just ∆pi multiplied by the ex post prioritarian gain from saving individual i.  Thus 
EPP
iS , the marginal change in ex post prioritarian social welfare per unit of current-period risk 
reduction for individual i, is nothing other than the ex post prioritarian gain from saving 
individual i.  
Note that our assumption that u(yi(t)) > 0 for all i, t—it is always better to survive a 
period than to die before its end—ensures that UiS , 
EAP
iS , and 
EPP
iS > 0 for all i.  Risk reduction 
is always a social benefit—whether social benefits are calculated using a utilitarian, ex ante 
prioritarian, or ex post prioritarian SWF.    
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  It would be of interest to consider the relation between SVRRi as defined here and the 
partial derivative of the SWF with respect to future survival probability.  Given space 
constraints, we do not address this topic, and instead focus in this Article on how the marginal 
social welfare impact of changes to current survival probability varies among individuals as a 
function of their ages, income profiles, and risk profiles.   
 2.4 Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) and the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) 
 BCA is an evaluation methodology that assigns a score to each policy by summing up 
individuals’ monetary equivalents for that policy. (Adler 2012, pp. 88-114; Boadway 2016).  In 
the model here, MEi(P), individual i’s monetary equivalent for policy P, is the change to her 
current status quo income that equalizes her expected utility as between the policy and the status 
quo.  We use B(∙) to denote the BCA methodology.   B(P) is the score assigned by BCA to policy 
P: the sum of monetary equivalents for P.  
Definition 3:  Benefit-Cost Analysis. 
1
( ) ( )
N
ii
B P ME P

 , with MEi(P) as formally 
defined in the accompanying footnote.27 
The value of statistical life (VSL) is standardly defined as the marginal rate of 
substitution between an individual’s material resources (wealth, income, or consumption) and 
survival probability.  (Eeckhoudt and Hammitt 2001; Evans and Smith 2006; Kaplow 2005; 
Hammitt 2007.) 
  Consistent with this general approach, we define VSLi in our model as follows.  












, with these 
partial derivatives evaluated at i’s status quo risk profile and income profile.28   
 
27 Let ( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( ))
i i i i i
V p p T y y T  denote individual i’s expected lifetime utility as a function of risk profile 
(pi(1), …, pi(T)) and income profile (yi(1), …, yi(T)).  That is, 
1
1
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t A p s

  .   Then MEi(P) 
= ∆y such that: 
( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( 1), ( ) , ( 1), ..., ( )) ( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( ), ..., ( ))O O O O O O O P P P P p
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
V p p T y y A y A y y A y T V p p T y y A y T    
. 
 Note that MEi(P), thus defined, is individual i’s “equivalent variation” for policy P.   Sometimes, BCA is 
defined instead as the sum of “compensating variations.”  (Boadway 2016; Freeman 2003, ch. 3.)  There are 
theoretical advantages to conceptualizing monetary equivalents for purposes of BCA as equivalent variations rather 
than compensating variations.  (Adler, Hammitt and Treich 2014, n. 8.)  However, that choice is not significant for 











.  See Appendix.    
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 The relation between VSLi and B is directly analogous to the relation between SVRRi and 
W.  Just as 







, so  







.   This was true in the one-period model 
analyzed in Adler, Hammitt and Treich (2014), and remains true in the lifetime model under 
consideration here.   
Proposition 2a.   













evaluated at i’s status quo income and risk 
profiles.  
Intuitively, VSLi is the marginal change in the sum of monetary equivalents per unit of 
current risk reduction for individual i, just as SVRRi is the marginal change in social welfare per 
unit of current risk reduction for individual i.  Assume that a policy intervention changes 
individual i’s current survival probability by ∆pi.   While the change in social welfare resulting 
from this risk change is approximately SVRRi Δpi, the change in the sum of monetary 
equivalents is approximately VSLi ∆pi.29  
 From Definition 4, plus the formulas above for Vi and the utilitarian SVRRi, it is 
straightforward to derive that VSLi equals the utilitarian SVRRi ( UiS ) divided by the expected 
marginal utility of i’s current income.  
Proposition 2b.   




i i i i
S
VSL
p A u y A


    
 
28 To state this definition more formally, let Vi be expressed as a function of individual i’s risk profile and income 
profile, as in note 24 immediately above.  ( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( ))
i i i i i i
V V p p T y y T .   Then VSLi = 
( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( )) ( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( ))
( ) ( )
O O O O O O O Oi i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i
V V
p p T y y T p p T y y T
p A y A
 
 
.   
 Adler, Hammitt and Treich (2014), using a one-period model, defined VSL as the marginal rate of 
substitution between survival probability and wealth.  In the multi-period model with myopic consumption that we 
use in this Article, an individual’s wealth in each period is zero—she consumes what she earns and saves nothing—
and so VSL is here defined as the marginal rate of substitution between survival probability and income or, 
equivalently, consumption. 
 
29 As in note 23 above, consider a policy intervention that changes individual i’s current survival probability by ∆pi; 
her survival probability in period t by ∆pit, with t > Ai; and her income in period t by ∆yit, with t ≥ Ai.  Again using 
the total-differential approximation from calculus, ∆B is approximately equal to:  
1
( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( )) ( (1), ..., ( ); (1), ..., ( ))
( ) ( )
i i
T T
O O O O t O O O O t
i i i i i i i i i i i i
i t A t Ai i
B B
p p p T y y T p p p T y y T y


















, t > Ai—can also be related to VSLi.  It can be shown that each such term equals VSLi multiplied 
by the marginal rate of substitution with respect to Vi between present survival probability and survival probability 
in period t.   
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 Given the formula for VSLi stated in Proposition 2b, it can be observed that the 
comparative statics of VSLi and the utilitarian SVRRi will be the same in the special case where 
all individuals in the status quo have the same expected marginal utility of current income.  In 
that case, the denominator in this formula will be the same for all individuals, and VSLi then 
equals UiS  multiplied by a common positive constant.  In general, however, relative to a generic 
status quo, VSLi and UiS  do not have the same comparative statics—as our analysis in Sections 3 
and 4 below will demonstrate.   
If we posit a perfect tax system that redistributes income so as to equalize individuals’ 
expected marginal utilities of (after-tax) present income, then the comparative statics of VSLi 
and UiS will be the same.  Observe, here, that equalizing incomes does not necessarily equalize 
expected marginal utilities of after-tax present income—since, for example, two individuals of 
the same age with the same after-tax present income but differing survival probabilities for the 
current period will have different expected marginal utilities.  
A terminological note.  We use the terms “SVRRi” and “VSLi” as the names for the 
concepts defined in Definitions 2 and 4 so as to emphasize that SVRRi and VSLi values are 
individual-specific.   In general, given two distinct individuals i and j, it need not be the case that 
SVRRi = SVRRj and it need not be the case VSLi =VSLj.   However, in what follows, so as to 
reduce clutter, we regularly drop the “i” subscript and use “SVRR” and “VSL” as shorthand, 
respectively, for “SVRRi” and “VSLi.”  
 
3.  Age Effects and “Priority for the Young”  
 The effect of age on the SVRR has never been addressed by the academic literature.  In 
this Section, we analyze what our model implies with respect to age effects on SVRR as well as 
VSL by considering two individuals i and j, with identical risk profiles and income profiles, but 
the first older than the second (Ai > Aj).  
 Both SVRRi and VSLi are determined by individual i’s status quo income profile and risk 
profile.  (See Propositions 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b.)  Thus, in analyzing the properties of SVRRi and VSLi 
in this Section as well as Section 4, we will not need to refer to incomes or probabilities, or to 
utilities as a function of incomes and probabilities, other than status quo values.  We therefore 
remove the “O” superscript on incomes, probabilities, and utilities, which is implicit.  yi(t) 
denotes ( )Oiy t , pi(t) denotes ( )
O
ip t , Vi denotes 
O
iV , and so forth.  Further, we often drop 
subscripts on incomes or probabilities where these are the same for i and j, e.g., y(t) indicates 
yi(t) =yj(t). 
 3.1 Age Effects and the Utilitarian SVRR 
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 What are the relative magnitudes of UiS  and
U
jS , for two individuals of different ages (Ai 
> Aj) but with identical risk and income profiles?  In other words, how does the utilitarian gain 
from saving an individual depend upon her age?  
   It can be shown that U Uj iS S equals:
 
1





j i j i
t A t A
t A u y t A A t A u y t    

 
      .   (See Appendix.) 
Thus the utilitarian SVRR decreases/is unchanged/increases with age iff the value of this formula 
is positive/zero/negative. 
 The first term in this formula (for short, the “duration term”) is positive.  By increasing 
the younger individual’s current survival probability, we increase her chance of surviving the 
periods Aj, Aj +1, …, Ai – 1 in her life, and that probability change for each such period yields an 
increment in expected lifetime well-being (by increasing her chance of accruing consumption 
utility with respect to that period).  This increment to expected lifetime well-being with respect 
to periods Aj, Aj +1, …, Ai – 1 does not occur if we increase the older individual’s survival 
probability, since he has already survived those periods.   
 The second term in the formula above (for short, the “risk term”) is negative.  By 
increasing either individual’s current survival probability, we increase that individual’s chance of 
surviving periods Ai, Ai + 1, …, T in his or her life, and thereby increase his or her chance of 
accruing consumption utility with respect to those periods. The risk term captures the difference 
between the magnitude of this benefit for the younger individual and its magnitude for the older 
one.  Since the older individual is sure to be alive at the beginning of period Ai, while the 
younger individual is not, this difference is negative. 
 Clearly, if income can increase with age, the magnitude of the risk term may exceed that 
of the duration term, and thus the utilitarian gain from saving the older individual i may be 
greater than that of saving the younger one.  What if constant income is assumed?  With a 
constant income profile and a constant risk profile, the duration term predominates and the 
utilitarian SVRR decreases with age.  More generally, it can be shown that if the income and risk 
profiles are such that income does not increase with age and survival probabilities do not 
increase with age, then the utilitarian SVRR decreases with age.  (See Appendix.)  
 3.2  Age Effects and the Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR 
 A simple manipulation shows that    ( ) ( ) ( )EAP EAP U U Uj i j j i i j iS S g V S S S g V g V       .  
We noted immediately above in discussing the utilitarian SVRR that the quantity ( )U Uj iS S  
equals a positive “duration” term plus a negative “risk” term.  The first part of the formula here, 
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namely  ( ) U Uj j ig V S S  , incorporates those terms.  This part is positive iff ( )U Uj iS S  is 
positive.  The second part of the formula here,  ( ) ( )Ui j iS g V g V  , is a third term (“priority for 
the young”), which is always positive.  Because Vi > Vj (the older individual has greater expected 
lifetime well-being) and g(ꞏ) is strictly concave, g′(Vi) < g′(Vj). 
 The intuition behind the formula is as follows.  Ex ante prioritarian social welfare, WEAP, 
is the sum of individuals’ transformed expected lifetime well-beings— transformed by a strictly 
increasing and strictly concave g(ꞏ) function.  The effect of this transformation is to give greater 
social weight to changes in expected lifetime well-being that accrue to individuals at a lower 
level of expected lifetime well-being.  The differential ex-ante-prioritarian benefit of saving a 
younger rather than older individual reflects the differential gains to expected lifetime well-being 
of saving the younger one ( )U Uj iS S .  But it also reflects the fact that the younger individual has 
a lower level of expected lifetime well-being and thus takes priority ( ( ) ( )j ig V g V  ). 
 We now define “Priority for the Young” more formally.   
Definition 5:  Priority for the Young.  Consider any two individuals i and j with identical 
risk profiles and income profiles (pi(t) = pj(t) and yi(t) = yj(t) for all t), and such that Ai > 
Aj.  SVRR for a given SWF W(∙) displays “Priority for the Young” iff the following is 
true for any such i and j: 0 0U Uj i j iS S S S     .  Similarly, VSL displays Priority for 
the Young iff the following is true for any such i and j: 0 0U Uj i j iS S VSL VSL     .  
 Priority for the Young is a precise expression, using the SVRR formalism, of the fair 
innings concept.  Recall our informal definition of “fair innings” in the Introduction (Section 1):  
As between a policy that produces a given gain in expected lifetime well-being for a younger 
person, and an otherwise-identical policy that produces the same gain in expected lifetime well-
being for an older person, it is ethically better for society to undertake the first policy.  Recall too 
(Section 3.1) that the utilitarian SVRRi, UiS , is equal to the per-unit gain to expected lifetime 
well-being from reducing i’s current fatality risk.  If i’s current survival probability increases by 
∆pi, his expected lifetime well-being increases by Ui ip S  . 
 If SVRRi for a given SWF W(∙) displays Priority for the Young, then it never assigns a 
smaller or equal value to risk reduction for the younger individual if the utilitarian risk-reduction 
value is larger for the younger than for the older individual.  (If the SWF displays Priority for the 
Young, it follows that: 0 0U Uj i j iS S S S     .)  Further, if the utilitarian risk-reduction 
values are equal, the SWF places a larger value on risk reduction for the younger individual. (If 
the SWF displays Priority for the Young, it also follows that: 0 0U Uj i j iS S S S     .).   
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 Proposition 3a.  The Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR displays Priority for the Young. 
 We can illustrate why ex ante prioritarianism satisfies Priority for the Young using the 
Bognar (2015) thought experiment presented in the Introduction.  Consider two patients, a young 
patient j and an older patient i, who are respectively at the beginning of periods two and three of 
their lives.  The maximum lifespan is three periods.  The patients have a common risk profile, 
with p2 the common survival probability for period two and p3 the common survival probability 
for period three.  Assume also that the patients are equally well off, materially.  Each faces the 
same, constant, income profile, with period utility normalized to 1 and a zero utility discount 
rate.   
 Finally, assume that p3 is close to zero, so that 1U Uj iS S  (as shown in note 27).  Thus, 
if we have one dose of a drug that can increase a patient’s current survival probability by some 
fixed increment, utilitarianism is indifferent between giving the drug to the younger or the older 
patient; the utilitarian SVRRs are approximately equal.  However, we easily obtain that  
2(1 ) (2)
EAP EAP
j iS g p S g      , by the concavity of g(ꞏ).30  Ex ante prioritarianism tells us to 
give the drug to the younger individual, who has a lower expected lifetime well-being (it is 
uncertain whether she will survive the second period, while the older patient will definitely live 
at least two periods).  Ex ante prioritarianism gives greater weight to a given increase in expected 
lifetime well-being if it accrues to an individual at a lower level of expected lifetime well-being, 
and so the younger patient takes priority. 
 Not only does ex ante prioritarianism satisfy Priority for the Young.  We can prove a 
logically stronger result, namely that the relative social value of risk reduction for young versus 
old individuals is always greater with ex ante prioritarianism than with utilitarianism.  
( / ) ( / )EAP EAP U Uj i j iS S S S .  If utilitarianism prefers to reduce the younger individual’s risk (the 
utilitarian gain from saving her is greater), ex ante prioritarianism has a yet greater degree of 
priority for the young.  If utilitarianism is indifferent (the utilitarian gains are equal), ex ante 
prioritarianism gives priority to the young.  Finally, although ex ante prioritarianism may prefer 
to reduce the risk of the older individual (if the utilitarian gain from saving her is sufficiently 
greater), in this case it always gives less priority to the older individual than utilitarianism does.   
Definition 6: Ratio Priority for the Young. Consider any two individuals i and j with 
identical risk profiles and income profiles (pi(t) = pj(t) and yi(t) = yj(t) for all t), and such 
that Ai > Aj.  SVRR for a given SWF W(∙) displays “Ratio Priority for the Young” iff the 
 
30 Vj, the expected lifetime well-being of the younger individual, is (1 – p2) (1) + p2(1 – p3) (2) + p2p3(3) = 1 + p2 + 
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following is true for any such i and j: ( / ) ( / )U Uj i j iS S S S .  Similarly, VSL displays 
Ratio Priority for the Young iff the following is true for any such i and j:
( / ) ( / )U Uj i j iVSL VSL S S  
Proposition 3b.  The Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR displays Ratio Priority for the Young.  
 Note that Ratio Priority for the Young is a logically stronger property than Priority for the 
Young.  If SVRR for a given W(∙) satisfies Ratio Priority for the Young, then necessarily it 
satisfies Priority for the Young; but the converse is not true.31 
 Both Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young are defined relative to a 
utilitarian baseline.   It is an immediate logical consequence of these definitions that the 
utilitarian SVRR displays neither property.  This is not a mathematical result, but simply the 
logical upshot of our definitions, and so we don’t include the utilitarian SVRR in the numbered 
propositions concerning Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young.  
 3.3 Age Effects and the Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR 
 It can be shown that EPP EPPj iS S equals:
 
1
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 Although this formula is different from EAP EAPj iS S , it nonetheless reflects the same three 
factors.  The first term of the formula is a positive “duration term,” reflecting the increased 
chance for the younger individual of surviving periods Aj through Ai −1; the second term is a 
 
31 In what follows, we assume that SVRR values are always positive.  (As remarked earlier, this is true, given the 






S , and 
EPP
i
S ; see Section 2.3.) 
 First, Ratio Priority for the Young implies Priority for the Young.  (1) If 0
U U
j i
S S  , then / 1U Uj iS S  .  
By Ratio Priority for the Young, / 1j iS S  .  Thus 0j iS S  .  (2) If 0
U U
j i
S S  , then / 1U Uj iS S  . By Ratio 
Priority for the Young, / 1j iS S  .  Thus 0j iS S  . 




S S  .  In this case, Priority for the Young places no constraint on the relative magnitudes of Sj and 
Si.   However, Ratio Priority for the Young requires that / /
U U
j i j i
S S S S . 
It’s also true, by directly parallel reasoning, that Ratio Priority for the Young as defined with respect to 
VSL is logically stronger than Priority for the Young as defined with respect to VSL. If VSL were to satisfy the first, 
it would satisfy the second, but not vice versa.  As it happens, however, VSL does not satisfy either.  See Section 
3.4. 




negative “risk term,” reflecting the chance she will not survive to period Ai; and the third term is 
a positive “priority for the young” term.   
 We saw above that the ex ante prioritarian SVRR displays “Priority for  the Young”: it 
prefers to reduce the younger individual’s risk even when utilitarianism is indifferent, and prefers 
to do so whenever utilitarianism does.  The same is true for the ex post prioritarian SWF.  
 Proposition 3c.   The Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR displays Priority for the Young. 
 The intuition for this result is as follows.  As explained earlier, the ex post prioritarian 
SVRR, 
( ; )
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    , is the difference between individual i’s 
expected transformed lifetime well-being conditional on surviving the current period, and her 
transformed lifetime well-being if she does not survive.  Equivalently, it is the expected 
difference between her transformed lifetime well-being conditional on surviving the current 
period (given her possible lifespans if she does survive and their probabilities), and her 
transformed lifetime well-being if she does not survive.   
 Consider now two individuals, one (j) younger than the second (i), with a common risk 
and income profile.  The ex post prioritarian SWF places less value on a risk reduction for i than 
for j because i’s lifetime well-being if she dies during the current period, U(Ai – 1), is greater 
than j’s if she dies during the current period, U(Aj – 1)—and thus the very same increase in 
lifetime well-being for the two individuals translates into a smaller change in transformed 
lifetime well-being for i.  Assume that i, if she survives the period, has probability δ of realizing 
a level of lifetime well-being which is ∆U greater than her level of lifetime well-being if she dies 
now.  And assume that the same is true for j.  The utilitarian value of a chance δ of increment ∆U 
is the same for both individuals, namely δ(∆U).  The ex post prioritarian value of a chance δ for 
individual j of increment  ∆U is  ( ( 1) ) ( ( 1))j jg U A U g U A      , while for i it is  
 ( ( 1) ) ( ( 1))i ig U A U g U A     . The first value is greater than the second by virtue of the 
strict concavity of g(ꞏ), because U(Aj – 1) < U(Ai – 1).  
 We can again use the Bognar (2015) thought experiment, now to illustrate why ex post 
prioritarianism satisfies Priority for the Young.  Following the example in Section 3.2 above, we 
have that utilitarianism is (approximately) indifferent between giving the drug to the younger 
patient and giving it to the older one, if p3 is small. 1.U Uj iS S   However, (3) (2)
EPP
iS g g  , 
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while (2) (1)EPPjS g g   if p3 is small.32  (If the older individual survives the period, her 
expected transformed lifetime well-being is g(3); her transformed lifetime well-being if she does 
not is g(2).  If the younger individual survives the period, her expected transformed lifetime 
well-being, with p3 small, is approximately g(2); her transformed lifetime well-being if she does 
not is g(1).).  By the concavity of g(ꞏ), g(3) – g(2) < g(2) – g(1).   
 We saw above that ex ante prioritarianism satisfies not merely Priority for the Young but 
also the (logically stronger) Ratio Priority for the Young. The same is true for ex post 
prioritarianism. 
 Proposition 3d.  The Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR Displays Ratio Priority for the Young  
 3.4 Age Effects and VSL  
As is well known, the effect of age on VSL is ambiguous. (Aldy and Viscusi, 2007; 
Hammitt, 2007).  In our model, age impacts VSL via its effect on the utilitarian SVRR (the 
numerator of VSL), plus an additional effect:  the change in expected marginal utility of 
consumption (the denominator of VSL) with age.   
As throughout this Section, let i and j be two individuals with identical risk and income 
profiles, and such that Ai > Aj.  Let ( ) ( ( ))iAi i iC p A u y A   and similarly for Cj.  Then VSLj − 
VSLi equals: 
 





    
  . 
 Note that the expected marginal utility of consumption for the younger individual (Cj) 
may be larger than for the older individual (Ci)—which can occur if the younger individual has 
less consumption and/or a greater current survival probability.  If Cj > Ci, the second term in the 
above formula for VSLj − VSLi will be negative even if 
U U
j iS S .  Further, if 
U U
j iS S , the 
second term will again be negative if Cj > Ci, and its magnitude may exceed that of the first term. 
 In short, it is not necessarily the case that 0 0U Uj i j iS S VSL VSL     ; and it is not 
necessarily the case that 0 0U Uj i j iS S VSL VSL     . 
 
32 Let Gj and Gi denote each individual’s expected transformed lifetime well-being.  Gj = (1−p2)g(1) + p2(1−p3)g(2) 
+ p2p3g(3).  Gi = (1 –p3)g(2) + p3g(3).  Then 3
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 Proposition 3e.  VSL does not display Priority for the Young. 
In other words:  BCA may prefer a risk reduction for the older individual even if the utilitarian 
gains are equal, indeed even if the utilitarian gain to saving the younger one is larger.  
 Because Ratio Priority for the Young is a logically stronger property than Priority for the 
Young33—if VSL were to display the former, it would necessarily display the latter—the  
proposition that VSL fails to display Priority for the Young implies (by contraposition) that it 
fails to display Ratio Priority for the Young.  
Proposition 3f.  VSL does not display Ratio Priority for the Young. 
 3.5 Age Effects: A Summary  
Table 1 summarizes the results of our analysis of age effects on the utilitarian, ex ante 
prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian social values of risk reduction (SVRR), and on VSL.  
   [Insert Table 1 here]  
 
 One “takeaway” from our analysis is that the concept of prioritarianism, in both its ex 
ante and ex post variants, provides a rigorous basis for the fair innings concept—as precisely 
expressed by the properties Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young.  Ex ante 
prioritarian social welfare, WEAP, is the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly concave 
transformation function, g(∙), applied to each individual’s expected lifetime well-being.  The ex 
ante prioritarian SVRR has the priority-for-the-young properties because a given increment in 
expected lifetime well-being is accorded greater social weight when provided to an individual at 
a lower level of expected lifetime well-being.  The ex post prioritarian SVRR has the priority-
for-the-young properties for a different reason.  The ex post prioritarian SWF, WEPP, applies the 
g(∙) function to individuals’ possible realized (not expected) lifetime well-being levels; calculates 
expected transformed lifetime well-being for each individual; and sums across individuals.  As 
compared to older persons with the same risk and income profile, younger persons face a lottery 
over possible realized lifetime well-being levels with a greater chance of lower realized levels, 
and a smaller chance of higher realized levels.  A given increment in realized lifetime well-being 
is accorded greater social weight by WEPP, if provided to someone at a lower level of realized 
lifetime well-being. 
 For those familiar with the literature on prioritarianism under uncertainty, it will be 
striking that both ex ante prioritarianism and ex post prioritarianism display Priority for the 
Young and Ratio Priority for the Young.  This literature demonstrates a range of significant 
axiomatic differences between the two variants of prioritarianism (including, as mentioned 
 
33 See note 31. 
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above, with respect to the ex ante Pareto and stochastic dominance axioms).  (Adler 2012 ch. 7; 
Adler 2019 app. J).  The current analysis shows that, notwithstanding these important 
differences, the two approaches are alike in supporting the fair innings concept. 
 Our analysis also extends an important finding of Adler, Hammitt and Treich (2014). 
That article, as mentioned, used a single-period model which was not suited to study age effects.  
What it did study was the effect of income and baseline risk on the utilitarian, ex ante 
prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian SVRRs and on VSL.  Here, Adler, Hammitt and Treich 
(2014) found that BCA and the SWF framework value risk reduction in significantly different 
ways.  The present analysis confirms that finding, now with respect to age effects.  By contrast 
with ex ante and ex post prioritarian SVRRs, VSL does not display Priority for the Young or 
Ratio Priority for the Young.     
4. The Effects of Income and Baseline Risk 
 We now consider how SVRR and VSL vary between individuals of the same age, but 
with different income or risk profiles.    
 4.1 Sensitivity to Income  
 We consider first whether SVRR and VSL increase, decrease, or are unchanged by a 
single-period increment in income.  Two individuals i and j are identical in age (Ai = Aj), in their 
risk profiles, and in their income profiles except that yj(t) = yi(t) + Δy, Δy > 0, for some single 
period t.  The period in which the individuals’ incomes differ can be the current period, in which 
case t =Ai = Aj, or it can be a past or future period.  We determine whether SVRRj > SVRRi, 








.  We proceed analogously 
for VSL. 
 We find as follows. 
Proposition 4a.  The utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment to past 
income.  It increases with a single-period increment to present or future income. 
Proposition 4b.   The ex ante prioritarian SVRR decreases with a single-period increment 
to past income.  The effect of a single-period increment to present income or future 
income on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous.34   
 
34  By “ambiguous” we mean the following.  The comparative statics of SVRR or VSL with respect to a parameter 
of interest (present income, future income, permanent income, age, etc.) are “ambiguous” if (a) we can find some 
combination of the other parameters and strictly increasing and strictly concave u(ꞏ) and g(ꞏ) such that SVRR or 
VSL is increasing in the parameter of interest, and (b) some alternative combination of the other parameters and the 
same u(ꞏ) and g(ꞏ) such that SVRR or VSL is decreasing in the parameter of interest.  
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Proposition 4c.  The ex post prioritarian SVRR decreases with a single-period increment 
to past income. It increases with a single-period increment to present or future income. 
Proposition 4d.  VSL is unchanged by a single-period increment to past income.  It 
increases with a single-period increment to present or future income. 
 Although we do not prove the propositions here (see Appendix), the following remarks 
may help to explain them.  Utilitarian SVRR.  The utilitarian SVRR is “history independent.”  As 
shown in the Appendix, the formula for UiS can be restated so as to make evident that it does not 
depend upon individual i’s past survival probabilities or incomes.  In particular, then, if i and j 
are identical except that j has a higher income than i in a single past period, UiS = 
U
jS .  The 
utilitarian SVRR increases with a single-period increment to present or future income because 
preventing the current death of an individual with greater present or future income produces a 
larger gain in expected lifetime well-being. 
 Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR.  Unlike the utilitarian SVRR, the ex ante prioritarian SVRR 
is “history dependent.”  While the formula for EAPiS does not depend upon i’s past survival 
probabilities, it does take account of her past income.  The explanation for why the ex ante 
prioritarian SVRR decreases with a single-period increment to past income is the following:  If 
individuals i and j are identical except that j has greater past income, then preventing either of 
their deaths in the current period produces the same increment in expected lifetime well-being, 
but individual i has a lower baseline level of expected lifetime well-being, thus takes priority 
under WEAP. 
 Why does a single-period increment to present or future income have an ambiguous 
effect on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR?  In a nutshell, the reason is this: If the two individuals 
are identical except that j has greater present or future income than i, then i has a lower baseline 
level of expected lifetime well-being, so takes priority under WEAP; but reducing her current risk 
produces a smaller increase in expected lifetime well-being than reducing j’s current risk.  
Whether WEAP prefers to reduce individual i’s current risk or instead individual j’s depends upon 
the concavity of the transformation function g(ꞏ).  In particular, we show that if g(∙) is such that 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion is always less than or equal to 1, a single-period 
increment to present or future income will increase the ex ante prioritarian SVRR. 
 Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR.  The ex post prioritarian SVRR, too, is history dependent.  
The formula for EPPiS , like the formula for 
EAP
iS , does not take account of i’s past survival 
probabilities but does take account of her past incomes.   Further, like the ex ante prioritarian 
SVRR, the ex post prioritarian SVRR decreases with a single-period increment to past income.  
However, unlike its ex ante counterpart, the ex post prioritarian SVRR always increases with a 
single-period increment to present or future income.  
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 The reason for the divergence between EAPiS  and 
EPP
iS  as regards sensitivity to present or 
future income is subtle.  The social value, as per WEPP, of preventing an individual from dying 
during the current period is the expected difference between the transformed lifetime well-being 
of the longer lives she might lead were she to survive the current period, and the transformed 
lifetime well-being of her life were it to end now.  Increasing present or future income increases 
that expected difference in transformed lifetime well-being.  
 VSL  Because VSLi equals UiS  divided by the expected marginal utility of i’s current 
income, the comparative statics of VSL with respect to past and future income are the same as 
for the utilitarian SVRR.  Further, because the utilitarian SVRR (the numerator of VSL) is 
increasing in current income, and the denominator is decreasing, VSL also increases in current 
income—indeed more quickly than the utilitarian SVRR. 
 Next, we consider the effect on SVRR and VSL of an increment to permanent income.  
Two individuals i and j are identical except that yj(t) = yi(t) + Δy, ∆y > 0, for every period t = 1 to 
T.  We find as follows. 
 Proposition 5a.  The utilitarian SVRR increases with an increment to permanent income. 
Proposition 5b.   The effect of an increment to permanent income on the ex ante 
prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous. 
Proposition 5c.  The effect of an increment to permanent income on the ex post 
prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous. 
Proposition 5d.  VSL increases with an increment to permanent income. 
 4.2 Sensitivity to Baseline Risk 
  We consider first whether SVRR and VSL increase, decrease, or are unchanged by a 
single-period increment in survival probability.  Two individuals i and j are identical except that 
pj(t) = pi(t) + Δq, Δq > 0, for some single period t.  We determine whether SVRRj > SVRRi, 








.  We proceed analogously 
for VSL. 
 None of the SVRRs, nor VSL, take account of past survival probabilities.  (The ex ante 
prioritarian and ex post prioritarian SVRRs are history-dependent because they take account of 
past incomes; but their formulas do not also depend upon past survival probabilities.)  We 
therefore focus on the case of a one-period change to present survival probability (t = Ai = Aj) or 
future survival probability. 
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Proposition 6a.  The utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment to 
present survival probability.  It increases with a single-period increment to future survival 
probability. 
Proposition 6b.  The ex ante prioritarian SVRR decreases with a single-period increment 
to present survival probability.  The effect of a single-period increment to future survival 
probability on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous. 
Proposition 6c.  The ex post prioritarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period 
increment to present survival probability.  It increases with a single-period increment to 
future survival probability. 
Proposition 6d.  VSL decreases with a single-period increment to present survival 
probability.  It increases with a single-period increment to future survival probability. 
 Again, see Appendix for proofs of the results.  The following remarks may help to 
explain them.    
Utilitarian SVRR.  The formula for UiS can be rewritten so that only future survival 
probabilities, not the current survival probability pi(Ai), show up in the formula. An increment to 
current survival probability therefore has no effect on the utilitarian SVRR.  The utilitarian 
SVRR is increasing with a one-period increment to future survival probability because 
preventing a current death produces a bigger increase in expected lifetime well-being if the 
individual has a lower chance of dying in future periods. 
 Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR.  The ex ante prioritarian SVRR is decreasing in current 
survival probability: An individual with lower present survival probability has a lower level of 
expected lifetime well-being, hence takes priority under WEAP.    
An individual with lower future survival probability also has a lower level of expected 
lifetime well-being, hence also takes priority under WEAP, but reducing her current risk produces 
a smaller increase in expected lifetime well-being.  Which effect predominates depends upon the 
concavity of g(∙).  Hence the impact on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR of a single-period 
increment to future survival probability is ambiguous.  We demonstrate, specifically, that if g(∙) 
is such that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is always less than or equal to 1, a single-
period increment to future survival probability will increase the ex ante prioritarian SVRR. 
 Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR.  The ex post prioritarian SVRR is unchanged by an 
increment to current survival probability.  (The formula for EPPiS can be rewritten so that pi(Ai) 
drops out of that formula.)  It is increasing with a single-period increment to future survival 
probability.  As noted earlier, the social value, as per WEPP, of preventing an individual from 
dying during the current period is the expected difference between the transformed lifetime well-
being of the longer lives she might lead were she to survive the current period, and the 
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transformed lifetime well-being of her life were it to end now.  Increasing future survival 
probability increases that expected difference in transformed lifetime well-being.  
  VSL.  VSL is the utilitarian SVRR divided by a denominator that increases with current 
survival probability, and is independent of future survival probability.   Because the utilitarian 
SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment to current survival probability, VSL decreases 
with such an increment.  Because the utilitarian SVRR increases with a single-period increment 
to future survival probability, VSL also increases with such an increment.  
 Next, we consider the effect on SVRR and VSL of a permanent increment to survival 
probability.  Two individuals i and j are identical except that pj(t) = pi(t) + Δq, Δq > 0, for every 
present and future period t (for every t ≥ Ai = Aj).  We find as follows. 
Proposition 7a.  The utilitarian SVRR increases with a permanent increment to survival 
probability. 
Proposition 7b. The effect of a permanent increment to survival probability on the ex ante 
prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous. 
Proposition 7c.  The ex post prioritarian SVRR increases with a permanent increment to 
survival probability. 
Proposition 7d.  The effect of a permanent increment to survival probability on VSL is 
ambiguous. 
4.3 Income and Baseline Risk: Summary 
   The comparative statics of the SVRRs and VSL with respect to income and survival 
probability are summarized in Table 2 immediately below: 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 Much about this table is noteworthy.  First, timing matters.  Whether individuals who 
differ with respect to income, or with respect to survival probability, have divergent SVRRs or 
VSL depends upon whether the income or survival probability difference occurs in the past, the 
present, or the future.  Consider the columns for “income: single-period difference” and 
“survival probability: single-period difference.”  The following is true for each of the three 
SVRRs and for VSL:  (1) its comparative statics (unchanged, increasing, decreasing, or 
ambiguous) are not the same for past, current, and future-period differences in income, and 
moreover (2) its comparative statics are not the same for current and future-period differences in 
survival probability.  
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 Second, the prioritarian SVRRs, ex ante and ex post, are history-dependent—specifically, 
with respect to income.  Each is decreasing with a one-period change to past income—by 
contrast with the utilitarian SVRR and VSL, which are independent of past income. 
 Third, this table confirms a key finding of Adler, Hammitt, and Treich (2014), using a 
simpler single-period model:  the manner in which VSL values risk reduction is not robust to a 
change in social evaluation framework.  VSL differs, in some significant way, from each of the 
SVRRs.  VSL and the utilitarian SVRR have the same comparative statics with respect to 
income, but not survival probability.  VSL and the prioritarian SVRRs have different 
comparative statics with respect to both income and survival probability.35 
 Fourth, the choice within the prioritarian family, between ex ante and ex post prioritarian 
approaches, is seen to be significant.  The ex ante prioritarian SVRR is decreasing in current 
survival probability and ambiguous with respect to future survival probability, while the ex post 
prioritarian SVRR is independent of current survival probability and increasing in future survival 
probability.  Both SVRRs are decreasing in past income, but: the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is 
ambiguous with respect to current and future income, while the ex post prioritarian SVRR is 
increasing with current and future income.36   
 This table, of course, concerns comparative statics: the direction of impact on VSL and 
the SVRRs of changes in risk and survival probability.  It doesn’t show the magnitude of 
impact—another type of difference between the various approaches.  This difference will emerge 
in the following Part, where we empirically estimate VSL and the SVRRs for the US population.  
 
5. SVRRs and VSL for the US Population  
 In this Section, we illustrate the SVRR and VSL concepts, and estimate their relative 
magnitudes, by calculating SVRR and VSL for cohorts of individuals characterized by varying 
risk profiles, income profiles and ages.  The income and survival data for this exercise derive 
from the actual U.S. population.  The U.S. Census Bureau collects data on the income 
distribution by age range.  We used this to estimate the percentiles of the income distribution for 
each age.  Assuming zero mobility (movement across percentiles), we determined a lifetime 
income profile for the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles of the U.S. income distribution. 
 
35 Except that, if g(ꞏ) has a coefficient of relative risk aversion less than or equal to one, the comparative statics of 
the ex ante prioritarian SVRR with respect to survival probability are the same as VSL. 
36 See Adler and Treich (2017), finding significant differences between ex ante and ex post prioritarianism in a 
model of intergenerational consumption allocation. 
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The lifetime risk profile for each of these five percentiles was based upon the actual U.S. 
population survival curve, and then adjusted to reflect income differences in life expectancy.37   
 We calculated the utilitarian SVRR, ex ante and ex post prioritarian SVRRs, and VSL by 
age for each of the five percentiles.  As per the analysis in Sections 2, 3 and 4, we did so on the 
assumption that an individual’s annual consumption in a given year is just her income.  A 
logarithmic utility function was used.38  The utility discount rate was set to 0.  For the 
prioritarian SVRRs, we used an “Atkinson” (isoelastic) SWF with both a moderate inequality-
aversion parameter (γ =1) and higher such parameter (γ = 2).  This yields four different 
prioritarian SVRRs (namely ex post or ex ante, with γ =1 or 2).  (On the attractive axiomatic 
properties of the Atkinson subfamily of prioritarian SWFs, see Adler 2012, ch. 5; Adler 2019 pp. 
154-58.) 
     [Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 The panels in Figure 1 display the SVRRs and VSL as a function of age, for each of the 
five percentiles.  The results are normalized so that 1 represents the SVRR or VSL for a 60 year 
old, median income individual.  
 As the panels show, the utilitarian SVRR decreases with age within each percentile (even 
though this is not theoretically required—see Section 3.1).  The prioritarian SVRRs also decrease 
with age within each percentile (as is required by Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for 
the Young given that the utilitarian SVRR does39). 
 
37 Specifically, data on the U.S. income distribution was taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS) income 
tables.  See https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-pinc.html.  We used the table 
PINC_01_1_1_1 (total work experience, both sexes, all races) for 2016.  A fourth degree polynomial in age was 
fitted to the data.  We assume that income for ages 20-24 is the same as for ages 25-30 and that income for ages 75-
100 is the same as for ages 70-74.  The U.S. population survival curve was taken from the life tables compiled by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  See https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/life_tables.htm. We used 
the 2014 life tables (National Vital Statistics Reports, vol. 66, no. 4, August 24, 2017). 
 A lifetime risk profile for the five percentiles was determined as follows.  We adjusted the U.S. population 
survival curve, as taken from the life table, by multiplying the annual mortality risk for each age by a scaling factor 
to reflect the individual’s income.  These scaling factors were, respectively, 1.5, 1.2, 1, 0.9, and 0.7 for, respectively, 
the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles of income.  The scaling factors were taken from Adler (2017, appendix 
C), who in turn estimated them to match findings by Chetty et al. (2016) regarding differences in life expectancy 
across income classes. 
38 Specifically, u(c) = ln c – ln(czero), czero = $1000, which is roughly the World Bank level of extreme poverty.  See 
Adler (2017, appendix C). 
39 Assume that the utilitarian SVRR decreases with age among a group of individuals with the same risk and income 
profile.  That is, for every age A, if Aj = A and Ai = A + 1 and i and j are in the group, then 
U U
j i
S S .    Since the 
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 The utilitarian SVRR increases with income: at every age, individuals in higher income 
percentiles have larger SVRRs.  This is reversed for the prioritarian SVRRs with γ =2; at every 
age, SVRR decreases with income.  γ =1 is an intermediate case, in which the utilitarian 
preference for income is almost neutralized but not reversed.  Note here that the lines displaying 
the ex ante and ex post prioritarian SVRR as a function of age are virtually the same for all 
income percentiles.  Thus the prioritarian SVRRs with moderate inequality aversion conform to 
widely held views regarding lifesaving policies, namely that the young should take priority but 
income should make no difference.40   
 VSL decreases with age for individuals above 40.  At earlier ages, for some income 
percentiles, VSL displays the inverted U (“hump”) shape often described in the literature.  (Aldy 
and Viscusi 2007; Hammitt 2007; Viscusi 2018, ch. 5).  
 The most striking difference between VSL and all the SVRRs concerns income effects: 
VSL increases with income at all ages, and much more steeply than even the utilitarian SVRR.  
This can be observed in Figure 1, and is displayed very clearly in Figure 2, which shows the ratio 
between SVRR or VSL at the 90th and 10th income percentiles as a function of age.  That ratio is 
between 0.5 and 3 for all the SVRRs, while generally exceeds 20 for VSL.  (In Figure 2, the 
abbreviation “U” indicates the utilitarian SVRR; “EAP 1” and “EAP 2” the ex ante prioritarian 
SVRR with γ =1 and 2, respectively; and “EPP 1” and “EPP 2” the ex post prioritarian SVRR 
with γ =1 and 2, respectively.  The “EAP” and “EPP” abbreviations are also used in Figure 3.) 
   
     [Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 Our exercise here also sheds light on the U.S. government’s practice of employing a 
single, population-average VSL, to value risk reduction (Robinson, 2007). Such an approach is 
not only inconsistent with the theory of BCA—as Figure 1 shows, VSL varies by age and 
income—but also with the SWF framework.  All of the SVRRs vary, at least, by age, and some 
by both age and income.  
 
prioritarian SVRRs satisfy Priority for the Young, it follows that EAP EAP
j i
S S  and EPP EPP
j i
S S .  Because Ratio 
Priority for the Young implies Priority for the Young (see note 31), this also follows from Ratio Priority for the 
Young.    
40 Dolan et al. (2005, p. 202), reviewing the survey literature regarding the public’s preferences for the allocation of 
health care, finds that “most studies suggest that health gains to the old are weighted less.”  Dolan et al. find some 
studies in which respondents prefer to allocate resources to those in lower socioeconomic groups.  However, 
Emanuel et al. (2020, p. 2051), discussing the allocation of scarce medical resources in the Covid-19 pandemic, and 
citing the public health literature, write: “Consensus exists that an individual person’s wealth should not determine 
who lives or dies.” 
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 Finally (see Figure 3) we estimate a “fair innings premium.”  Recall that both ex ante 
prioritarian and ex post prioritarian SVRRs have the property of Ratio Priority for the Young: the 
ratio of prioritarian SVRRs, between a younger and older person with the same lifetime income 
and risk profile, is always larger than the ratio of utilitarian SVRRs.  Figure 3 shows the 
magnitude of this difference in ratios.  For individuals of the median income profile and 
associated risk profile, we calculate the percentage by which the ratio between the ex ante or ex 
post prioritarian SVRR of an individual of each age and a 60-year-old’s ex ante or ex post 
prioritarian SVRR exceeds the comparable ratio for the utilitarian SVRR.41  
     [Insert Figure 3 here] 
     
 
6. Conclusion 
 This Article has undertaken an extensive analysis of the social value of risk reduction 
(SVRR).  SVRR is the linchpin concept for applying a social welfare function (SWF) to one 






.  It is the marginal 
change in social value, as determined by SWF W(∙), per unit of risk reduction for individual i.  
We investigate SVRR for three major SWFs (utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post 
prioritarian), using a lifetime model that allows us to differentiate individuals by age, lifetime 
risk profile, and lifetime income profile.  
 Economists have intensively investigated the SWF framework in certain policy arenas, 
such as taxation and climate policy.  However, the application of SWFs to the domain of risk 
regulation has been little studied.  Our analysis demonstrates, in detail, how the social weight 
placed upon a reduction in a given individual’s fatality risk depends upon the functional form of 
the SWF.  In their comparative statics with respect to income and baseline risk, the three SVRRs 
differ significantly from each other.  At the same time, each of the SVRRs deviates substantially 
from VSL—the valuation concept for risk reduction that is used by benefit-cost analysis (BCA), 
currently the dominant methodology in governmental practice and in applied economics.  In a 
nutshell, then, our analysis shows that a rigorous intellectual apparatus with deep roots in welfare 
economics—the SWF framework—values individual risk reduction in a manner quite different 
from BCA.  In an empirical exercise, we confirm this finding.  
 Moreover, we show that the “fair innings” concept, popular in the public health literature, 
has a firm, formal basis within welfare economics.  Specifically, both the ex ante prioritarian and 
 
41 That is, we calculate 60 60[( / ) / ( / )] 1
EAP EAP U U
j j
S S S S   and 60 60[( / ) / ( / )] 1
EPP EPP U U
j j
S S S S  for each age j. 
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ex post prioritarian SVRRs satisfy axioms of Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the 
Young.  In effect, a young person takes priority over an older person with respect to risk 
reduction even when the gains in expected lifetime well-being are equal.  (By contrast, BCA 
does not support the fair innings concept; a younger individual may have a lower VSL even 
when the gains to expected lifetime well-being are equal.)  As far as we are aware, this Article is 
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On-line Appendix for Adler, Ferranna, Hammitt, Treich, “Fair Innings? The Utilitarian 
and Prioritarian Value of Risk Reduction over a Whole Lifetime.” 
This Appendix provides mathematical backup for all propositions stated in the text of the 
Article, and for other mathematical claims whose derivations are not straightforward.  The order 
of the Appendix corresponds to the order of the text. 
Formulas for πi(t; t*) and μi(t; t*) are used pervasively in the derivations.  As stated in the 
text, πi(t; t*) is individual i’s probability of surviving through the end of period t, conditional on 
being alive at the beginning of period t*.  In particular, πi(t; Ai) is individual i’s probability of 
surviving through the end of period t, conditional on her current age (Ai).  If t < t*, then πi(t; t*) = 
1.  If t ≥ t*, then
*




t t p s

 .  Substituting Ai for t*, we arrive at formulas for πi(t; Ai). 
It is possible that Ai = T.  In this case, it is not clear how to interpret πi(t; Ai + 1), t ≤ T. 
We stipulate that πi(t; Ai + 1) = 1 if Ai = T and t ≤ T.1 
μi(t; t*) is individual i’s probability of surviving through the end of period t and then 
dying—the probability of living exactly t periods—conditional on being alive at the beginning of 
period t*.  In particular, μi(t; Ai) is individual i’s probability of living exactly t periods, 
conditional on her current age.  If t < t* −1, μi(t; t*) = 0.  If t = t* − 1, μi(t; t*) = 1 – pi(t*).  If t ≥ 
t*, 
*
( ; *) ( ) (1 ( 1)) ( ; *)(1 ( 1))
t
i i i i i
s t
t t p s p t t t p t 

 
      
 
 .  Substituting Ai for t*, we arrive at 
formulas for μi(t; Ai). 
 It is possible that Ai = T.  In this case, we stipulate that μi(t; Ai + 1) = 1 if t = T and μi(t; Ai 
+ 1) = 0 otherwise.  
 The derivations often use the summation symbol, ∑.  If the variables are such that the 
lower bound of the summation exceeds the upper bound, then the summation is “empty” and set 








  equals zero.  The derivations 
also use the product symbol ∏.  If the lower bound of the product exceeds the upper bound, then 








  equals 1. 
   
  
 
1 Individuals live at most T periods, and so the supposition that individual i is alive at the beginning of period T + 1 
may be thought to be problematic.  Actually, if we conceptualize the beginning of period T + 1 as the moment in 
time right after the end of period T, then πi(t; T + 1), t ≤ T,  is individual i’s probability of surviving through the end 
of period t, conditional on having survived to the end of period T, which is 1.  In any event, to avoid doubt on the 
issue, we simply stipulate that πi(t; Ai + 1) = 1 if Ai = T and t ≤ T. 
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I. Results in Section 2 of the Article 
Section 2.1: Relation between At-Birth Survival Probabilities and Currently Known Survival 
Probabilities. 
 As explained in Section 2.1, individual i’s profile of survival probabilities (pi(1), …, 
pi(T)) are her at-birth probabilities, which do not change as she ages.  It bears a reminder that 
these at-birth “survival probabilities” are conditional probabilities:  pi(t) is individual i’s 
probability of surviving to the end of period t, conditional on being alive at the beginning of 
period t.  The key mathematical concepts that drive the Article’s analysis—namely, the 
utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian SWFs (Definitions 1a, 1b, 1c); the SVRRi 
defined in terms of these SWFs (Definition 2); and VSLi (Definition 4)—are all defined in terms 
of individuals’ profiles of at-birth survival probabilities. 
 In note 10, we comment that our analysis would not change if we used currently-known 
survival probabilities rather than at-birth survival probabilities.  Let (pi*(1), …, pi*(T)) be 
individual i’s profile of survival probabilities, updated to reflect the information that she has 
survived to the beginning of the current period, period Ai in her life.  Note that pi*(t) = πi(t; Ai)/ 
πi(t − 1; Ai).  If t < Ai, then πi(t; Ai)/ πi(t − 1; Ai) = 1/1 = 1.  If t = Ai, then 
( ; ) / ( 1; ) ( ) /1 ( )i i i i i i i it A t A p A p A     .  If t > Ai , then 
1
( ; ) / ( 1; ) ( ) / ( ) ( )
i i
t t
i i i i i i i
s A s A
t A t A p s p s p t 

 
   
        
   
  . 
 Thus pi*(t) = 1 for t < Ai, and pi*(t) = pi(t) for t ≥ Ai.  Finally, it can be observed that the 
SWFs, SVRRi, and VSLi are all defined in terms of individuals’ survival probabilities for the 
present and future periods, not past periods.  The values of WU, WEAP, WEPP, the corresponding 
SVRRs, and VSLi do not depend upon pi(t) for t < Ai.  Because pi*(t) = pi(t) for t ≥ Ai, our 
analysis would reach the same result if we defined our key concepts (SWFs, SVRRi, and VSLi) 
in terms of currently known survival probabilities rather than at-birth survival probabilities. 
   
Section 2.1: Alternative Formula for Vi.  
1
1
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t t A
V u y t t A u y t  

 
    
 Vi is i’s expected lifetime well-being with a given income and risk profile.  Thus the main 
formula for Vi is
1
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    .  To see this, note that πi(t; Ai)pi(t + 
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      
 This proposition follows from the definition of Vi as
1





t A U t
 
 ; the definition of 
WU(∙) as the sum of Vi (Definition 1a); and the definition of  SVRRi as the partial derivative of 
W(∙) with respect to i’s current survival probability pi(Ai), evaluated at i’s status quo income and 
risk profile (Definition 2).  Note that μi(Ai – 1; Ai) = 1 – pi(Ai), and that 
( ; ) ( ) (1 ( 1))
i
t
i i i i
s A
t A p s p t

 
    
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 for t = Ai −1; and 
( ; ) ( ; )
( ) ( )
i i i i
i i i i
t A t A




for t ≥ Ai.   
 
Proposition 1b.  ( )EAP O Ui i iS g V S   
 This proposition follows from the definition of WEAP(∙) as the sum of g(Vi) (Definition 







 evaluated at i’s status 
quo risk and income profile. 
 
Proposition 1c.  
( ; )




EPP O Oi i
i i i iO
t A i i
t A




     
 This proposition follows from the definition of WEPP as the sum across individuals of 
1





t A g U t
 
  (Definition 1c) and the definition of SVRRi.  The derivation is analogous 
to the derivation of Proposition 1a. 
 
Proposition 2a.  













evauated at i’s status quo risk and income profiles.  
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Let ( , )P Pi ip y  be shorthand for i’s risk and income profile with policy P.  MEi(P) = 
( , )P Pi i iME p y  is such that:  
( (1),..., ( ); (1),..., ( 1), ( ) , ( 1),..., ( )) ( )( , ) ,O O O O O O Oi i i i i i i i i i i i
P P P P
i i i i iV p p T y y A y A ME y A y T V    pp y y .  
In what follows, we assume that MEi(∙) is a differentiable function of i’s risk and income profile. 
 Let ( ( , ))P Pi i iF ME p y
( (1),..., ( ); (1),..., ( 1), ( ) ( , ), ( 1),..., ( ))O O O O O P P O Oi i i i i i i i i i i i i iV p p T y y A y A ME y A y T  p y    
 Then ( ( , )) ( , )P P P Pi i i i i iF ME Vp y p y .  Differentiating both sides by pi(Ai), we have that  
( ( , )) ( , ) ( , )
( ) ( )
P P P P P Pi i
i i i i i i i
i i i i i
ME VdF
ME




p y p y p y  .  In particular,  
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p y p y p y  .  Finally, since 
1 1 1
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p y p y p y .   
 In note 24 of the Article, we note that it is also the case that 







 if B is 
defined in terms of compensating rather than equivalent variations.  Let individual i’s 
compensating variation, ( , )P Pi i iCV p y , be defined as follows.  ( , )
P P
i i iCV p y is such that: 
( , ) ( (1),..., ( ); (1),..., ( 1), ( ) ( , ), ( 1),..., ( ))O O P P P P P P P P Pi i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iV V p p T y y A y A CV y A y T   p y p y .  If 
1 1 1
(( , ),..., ( , )) (( , )
NP P P P P P
N N i i ii
B CV

p y p y p y , then 
1 1(( , ),..., ( , ) ( , )( ) ( )
P P P P P Pi
N N i i
i i i i
CVB




p y p y p y .  We assume, analogously to above, that CVi(∙) is 
a differentiable function of i’s risk and income profile.   
 Let 
( , , ( , )) ( (1),..., ( ); (1),..., ( 1), ( ) ( , ), ( 1),..., ( ))P P P P P P P P P P P P Pi i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iG CV V p p T y y A y A CV y A y T   p y p y p y  
.  Then ( , , ( , )) ( , )P P P P O Oi i i i i i i iG CV Vp y p y p y .  Differenting both sides of this equation with respect 
to pi(Ai), we have that ( , , ( , )) 0
( )
P P P P








p y p y .  
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V V CVG
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p y p y  , with the partial derivatives on the RHS 
of this equation evaluated at 
( (1),..., ( ); (1),..., ( 1), ( ) ( , ), ( 1),..., ( )))P P P P P P P P Pi i i i i i i i i i i i i iV p p T y y A y A CV y A y T  p y .  In particular, 
noting that  ( , ) 0O Oi i iCV p y , we have that ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0( ) ( )
O O O O O Oi i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i
V V CV




p y p y p y .  
Because ( , ) ( , )
( )
O O O Oi i







p y p y  , we have that 
( , ) ( , ) / ( , )
( ) ( ) ( )
O O O O O Oi i i
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
CV V V
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p y p y p y  . 
 
Proposition 2b.  
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, with these partial 
derivatives evaluated at i’s status quo risk and income profile (Definition 4).  / ( )i i iV p A   
evaluated at i’s status quo risk and income profile is just UiS .  The alternative formula for Vi (as 
demonstrated above) is: 
1 1
1 1 1





At t t t
i i i i i i i i i i i i i
t t A t t A
V u y t t A u y t u y t p A u y A t A u y t      
 
    
       
.  It follows that / ( )i i iV y A  evaluated at i’s status quo risk and income profile is: 
( ) ( ( ))iAO Oi i i ip A u y A  .  
 
 Note regarding symbolism.  The remaining propositions and other results proved in this 
Appendix are manipulations of the formulas for SVRRi and VSLi.  Thus, in the remainder of the 
Appendix, as in the corresponding sections of the main text (Sections 3 and 4), we remove the 
“O” superscript on incomes, probabilities, and utilities, which is implicit.  yi(t) denotes ( )Oiy t , 
pi(t) denotes ( )Oip t , Vi denotes 
O
iV , and so forth.  Further, we may drop subscripts on incomes or 
probabilities where two individuals i and j are being compared and these quantities are the same 






II. Results in Section 3 of the Article 
 In all the propositions and other mathematical claims proved here, from Section 3 of the 
Article, i and j are two individuals with identical risk and income profiles, and i is older than j (Ai 
> Aj).       
Section 3.1: Formula for U Uj iS S .
 
1




U U t t
j i j i j i
t A t A
S S t A u y t A A t A u y t    
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 
           
 Using the formula derived above for Vi, 
1
1





i i i i i
t t A
V u y t t A u y t  

 
    for a 
generic individual i, together with the definition of UiS  as the partial derivative of W
U(∙) with 








t A i i
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 Consider now the case at hand:  i and j are two individuals with the same risk and income 
profiles, and Ai > Aj.  
1 ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )
( ( )) ( ( ))




j jU U t ti
j i
t A t Aj j i
t A t A t A
S S u y t u y t
p A p A p A




     
 
  .  The 
first term on the RHS is 
1







t A u y t 


 , while the second term is equal to 
 
1 1




i j i i
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       
 
   =






A A t A u y t  

    . 
 
Section 3.1:  If income is non-increasing with age and survival probabilities are non-increasing 
with age, the utilitarian SVRR decreases with age. 
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   and 
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t A AT A A t
t A At
i j
t A s A s A
p s u y t p s u y t A A 
  
 
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     
If income and survival probability are non-increasing with time, each term in the summation 
immediately above is non-negative.2  It follows that 
( )
1 11 1
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))
i j
j ij i
T A A t tT
t t
t A t As A s A
p s u y t p s u y t 
 
      
   
        
   .  Moreover, if income is non-increasing 
with time, ( ( )) ( ( ))j iA Aj iu y A u y A  . 3  Finally, 
( ) 1 1
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   .  Thus 
U U
j iS S .   
   (b)  Consider next the case in which Ai = T.  In this case, ( ( ))iAUi iS u y A . 
1 1





t A s A
S u y A p s u y t 
   
 
    
 
  .  If income is non-decreasing with time,  
( ( )) ( ( ))j iA Aj iu y A u y A  .  
1 1




t A s A
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  .  Thus U Uj iS S .  
 
Proposition 3a.  The ex ante prioritarian SVRR displays Priority for the Young 
 As noted in the text,    ( ) ( ) ( )EAP EAP U U Uj i j j i i j iS S g V S S S g V g V       .  Vj < Vi and 
thus g′(Vj) > g′(Vi)  by the strict concavity of g(∙).  0UiS  , and thus  ( ) ( ) 0Ui j iS g V g V   .  
Finally, g′(Vj) > 0 by the strict increasingness of g(∙).  It therefore follows that if 0U Uj iS S  , 
then 0EAP EAPj iS S  ; and if 0
U U
j iS S  , then 0
EAP EAP
j iS S  . 
 
 
2 If income and survival probabilities are constant and β = 1, each term is 0 rather than positive.   
 
3 If income is constant and β = 1, these two quantities are equal.  
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.  Because g(∙) is strictly increasing and strictly concave and Vj 
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Section 3.3:  Formula for EPP EPPj iS S  
 
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, with i and j two individuals with the same risk and income profiles¸ and Ai > Aj.   
 Using the formula for the ex post prioritarian SVRR (Proposition 1c), we have that 
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. The first term on the RHS is 
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

 . The second term is equal to: 
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1 1
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A A t A g U t 

   .  
 
Proposition 3c.  The ex post prioritarian SVRR displays Priority for the Young.  
 Rather than prove this directly, we prove Proposition 3d, below, namely that the ex post 
prioritarian SVRR displays Ratio Priority for the Young.  Ratio Priority for the Young is 
logically stronger than Priority for the Young (see Article, note 28), i.e., Proposition 3c follows 
from Proposition 3d. 
 
Proposition 3d.  The ex post prioritarian SVRR displays Ratio Priority for the Young.  
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In what follows, we’ll abbreviate g(U(Aj −1)) and g(U(Ai −1)) as ( 1)jAg   and ( 1)iAg  , 
respectively; and U(Aj −1) and U(Ai – 1) as ( 1)jAU   and ( 1)iAU   , respectively.  π(Ai) and π(Aj) are 
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 Turning to the utilitarian SVRR:  we can proceed by steps parallel to those immediately 
above to derive the following expressions for UiS and 
U
jS .  
   
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.  This is because—by the 
strict concavity of g(∙)—each term in the numerator of the preceding fraction is less than or equal 
to θ times the corresponding term in the denominator.  Similarly,  
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Proposition 3e. VSL does not display Priority for the Young. 
 This proposition is proved in the text of the Article. 
 
Proposition 3f.  VSL does not display Ratio Priority for the Young. 
 As noted in the Article, this proposition follows from Proposition 3e because Ratio 
Priority for the Young is logically stronger than Priority for the Young.  It can also easily be 


















iS  > 0.  Ci > 0, Cj > 0.  It’s possible that Ci ≤ Cj, e.g., if p(Ai) ≤ p(Aj) and uʹ(y(Ai)) ≤ 


















III. Results in Section 4.1 of the Article 
 For purposes of proving propositions 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d, we assume that i and j are 
identical in age (Ai = Aj), in their risk profiles, and in their income profiles except that yj(t) = yi(t) 
+ Δy, Δy > 0, for some single period t—a past period, the current period (t = Ai = Aj) or a future 
period.  We determine whether SVRRj > SVRRi, SVRRj = SVRRi, or SVRRj < SVRRi by 








.  We proceed analogously for VSL.  Statements regarding 
increments to future periods assume that Ai = Aj ≤ T −1. 
 
Proposition 4a.  The utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment to past income.  
It increases with a single-period increment to present or future income. 
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= 0 for t < Ai.  
( ; )
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y t p A
   

 for all t ≥ Ai.  
 
Proposition 4b.  The ex ante prioritarian SVRR decreases with a single-period increment to past 
income. The effect of a single-period increment to present income or future income on the ex 
ante prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous. 
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
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 For t ≥ Ai, 
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1
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i i is A
s A u y s 
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 .  
 Note that ( ; ) ( ( ))
i
T s
i i i is A
V s A u y s 

 .  Thus, manipulating the above equation, we 





















.  In short, if g(∙) is such that the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion is always less than or equal to 1, a one-time increment to present or 




Proposition 4c.  The ex post prioritarian SVRR decreases with a single-period increment to past 
income. It increases with a single-period increment to present or future income. 
 For t < Ai, 
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( ( )) ( ( 1)) ( ( )) 0
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  For t ≥ Ai, 
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
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Proposition 4d.  VSL is unchanged by a single-period increment to past income.  It increases 
with a single-period increment to present or future income. 








  , Ci > 0. 
 For t < Ai, t > Ai, 
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for t > Ai  (see 









 For t = Ai, 
2
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 Propositions 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d concern the effect on SVRR and VSL of an increment to 
permanent income.  Here, we assume that two individuals i and j are identical except that yj(t) = 
yi(t) + ∆y, ∆y > 0, for all periods.  
 
Proposition 5a.  The utilitarian SVRR increases with an increment to permanent income. 
 Because the utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment to past income, 
and increases with a single-period increment to present or future income, it clearly increases with 
an increment to permanent income. 
 
Proposition 5b.  The effect of an increment to permanent income on the ex ante prioritarian 
SVRR is ambiguous. 
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 An example suffices to prove that the effect of an increment to permanent income is 
ambiguous.  Let T =2, β = 1, Ai = Aj = 2, pi(2) = p, and yi(1) = yi(2) = y.  Then Vi = u(y)(1 + p).  
Denote (1 + p) as q. ( ( )) ( ( ) )EAPiS u y g u y q .   ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ( ) )
EAP
iS u y g u y q u y q g u y q
y
    

.  The 
sign of this expression is positive iff ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ( ) ) 0g u y q u y q g u y q   or, equivalently, 
( ( ) )
( ) 1
( ( ) )
g u y q
u y q






Proposition 5c.  The effect of an increment to permanent income on the ex post prioritarian 
SVRR is ambiguous. 
An example suffices to prove that the effect of an increment to permanent income is 
ambiguous.  Let T =2, β = 1, Ai = Aj = 2, pi(2) = p, and yi(1) = yi(2) = y.  Then 
(2 ( )) ( ( ))EPPiS g u y g u y  .  2 (2 ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
EPP
iS g u y u y g u y u y
y
     

, the sign of which depends 
upon 2g′(2u(y)) − g′(u(y)).  Depending on g(ꞏ), this term can be positive, negative, or zero for 
u(y) > 0. 
 
Proposition 5d.  VSL increases with an increment to permanent income. 
 Because VSL is unchanged by a single-period increment to past income, and increases 
with a single-period increment to present or future income, it clearly increases with an increment 
to permanent income. 
 
IV. Results in Section 4.2 of the Article 
 For purposes of proving Propositions 6a, 6b, 6c, and 6d, we assume that i and j are 
identical in age (Ai = Aj), in their income profiles, and in their risk profiles except that pj(t) = pi(t) 
+ Δq, Δq > 0, for some single period t—either the current period (t = Ai = Aj) or a future period.  









.  We proceed analogously for VSL. Statements regarding increments to future 
periods assume that Ai = Aj ≤ T −1. 
 
Proposition 6a.  The utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment to present 
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 .  (See above, Appendix p. 6) 
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 For t > Ai, 
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Proposition 6b.  The ex ante prioritarian SVRR decreases with a single-period increment to 
present survival probability.  The effect of a single-period increment to future survival 
probability on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous. 

































for t = Ai, by Proposition 6a.   2( ) 0.Ui ig V S    
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 is less than/equal to/greater than 
1
( ; ) ( ( ))
i
T s
i i is A
s A u y s 
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 .  Observing again that ( ; ) ( ( ))
i
T s
i i i is A
V s A u y s 

 , we have a 
parallel result here as for the effect of present income and future income (see above, 
demonstration of Proposition 4b):  a one-period increment to future survival probability will 
increase the ex ante prioritarian SVRR if the coefficient of relative risk aversion for g(ꞏ) is 
uniformly less than or equal to one.   
 
Proposition 6c.  The ex post prioritarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment to 
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 for t = Ai.   
 
 
 For t > Ai,  
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  , and that g(Ui(s)) > g(Ui(t – 1)) for s ≥ t by the strict increasingness of 
g(∙).  Hence, for t > Ai,  
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Proposition 6d.  VSL decreases with a single-period increment to present survival probability.  It 
increases with a single-period increment to future survival probability. 
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for t = Ai; see Proposition 6a.)  
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 (Proposition 6a). 
 
Propositions 7a, 7b, 7c and 7d concern the effect on SVRR and VSL of a permanent 
increment to (present and future) survival probability.  Here, we assume that two individuals i 
and j are identical except that pj(t) = pi(t) + ∆q, ∆q > 0, for all present and future periods.  
 
Proposition 7a.  The utilitarian SVRR increases with a permanent increment to survival 
probability. 
 Because the utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment to present 
survival probability, and increases with a single-period increment to future survival probability, 




Proposition 7b. The effect of a permanent increment to survival probability on the ex ante 
prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous. 
An example is sufficient to prove that the impact of a permanent increment in survival 
probability is ambiguous.  Let T = 3, β = 1, Ai = 2, pi(2) = pi(3) = p, and yi(1) = yi(2) = yi(3) = y.  
Vi = u(y)[1 + p + p2], and ( ) ( )(1 )EAPi iS g V u y p  . 
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. Note, in turn, that 
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.  This last term is 
bounded below by ½ and above by 1.  Thus the ex ante prioritarian SVRR in this case increases 
with a permanent increment in survival probability if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 
sufficiently small, and decreases with a permanent increment in survival probability if the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is sufficiently large.  
 
Proposition 7c:  The ex post prioritarian SVRR increases with a permanent increment to survival 
probability.  
Because the ex post prioritarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment to 
present survival probability, and increases with a single-period increment to future survival 
probability, it clearly increases with a permanent increment to survival probability. 
 
Proposition 7d.  The effect of a permanent increment to survival probability on VSL is 
ambiguous. 
An example is sufficient to prove that the impact of a permanent increment to survival 
probability is ambiguous.  Let T = 5, β = 1, Ai = 2; pi(t) = p for t ≥ 2; yi(t) = y for all t.  
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.  Since u(y), 













if p2 + 2p3 – 1 < 0.  
